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This thesis explores the question of how climate change, and in particular, water scarcity affects 
relationships between India and its neighbors, specifically at these border zones that have a history 
of being contentious. The relations between India and its neighbors, particularly China and 
Bangladesh, are marked by certain variables that make them prone to hostilities. Take for example, 
the aggressively anti-Muslim stance of the Modi administration and its increasing instrangience 
on matters of migration from Bangladesh, who is also seeing a shift towards authoritarianism. 
China and India too are engaging in border skirmishes and melees as China grows into its 
superpower shoes, and challenging India’s claims over bordering regions. I will argue that water 
is the ‘blue veins’ of the subcontinent that truly ties all these conflicts together and will determine 
whether or not India will see peace, conflict or unstable stasis with Bangladesh and China. This 
thesis will center discussions on establishing two points; what has previously occurred to make 
these borders contentious in an environmental and specifically water-sharing sense, and secondly, 
how has or will water scarcity affect(ed) the dynamic in the border zone between India and the 
second country.  In essence, the paper will explore why neighbors fight over river sharing and how 
water scarcity affects this already contentious relationship. I will argue that the lack of institutional 
resilience, contentious state of infrastructure, a lack of social stability within countries, an overall 
hostile tenor of relations between riparian states and finally an asymmetrical balance of power, 
predisposes two or more nation states who are riparian parties to have conflicts over the shared 
transboundary resource. The specific case studies I will be examining will be between India and 
Bangladesh, as well as India and China, examined through the lens of the river basins the borders 




Section 1: Introduction 
I. Introduction  
a. Focus of this thesis & definitions 
 
This thesis will focus on identifying sites of transboundary water conflicts between India and 
its neighboring countries on contentious borders. The lens I will be using to examine these sites of 
conflict will be through the river basins; Ganges Basin, and the Brahmaputra Basin1. The crux of 
this thesis will firstly be establishing what is currently going on at these borders to make it 
contentious and secondly, how has water scarcity changed the dynamics between India and the 
second country in that border zone. In simpler terms, it is about asking why neighbors fight when 
forced to share rivers, and how water scarcity makes this fighting worse. The case studies that will 
be looked at are the following: India-Bangladesh and India-China. In the interest of writing an in 
depth and concise thesis, I have chosen to focus on three riparian states: India, China, and 
Bangladesh. India of course is the dominant South Asian power and being the upper riparian state 
in most of its transboundary river sharing has a fair amount of influence. Bangladesh, being the 
lower riparian party in the case of the Brahmaputra as well as the Ganges, has the most to lose in 
the upcoming decades due to projected water scarcity. The Brahmaputra River is indeed important 
to India, but it is vital to Bangladesh. Finally, the inclusion of China, while on the surface 
surprising, is essential to understanding the key role China is beginning to play in South Asia. In 
the light of the recent Galwan Valley clashes with India, it is apparent China is beginning to seek 
out a more aggressive strategy in South Asia that appears similar to its South China Sea tactics.2 
Hence, it is only prudent to study what the implications of such a foreign policy escalation would 
 
1 The reason I chose to look group the case studies according to which river basins they involve instead of each 
country’s border with India as a case study is because oftentimes, more than one country is a riparian state.  




mean for India-China relations as it pertains to hydropolitics especially in the context of water 
scarcity.  
b. Relevance of the issue of water scarcity 
 
Certainly, the problems of water scarcity do not just apply to the remit of South Asia, but also 
in other regions of the world such as the Aral Sea Basin in Central Asia where transboundary water 
basin sharing of Amu and Syr Darya concerns the nations of three downstream countries; 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and also two upstream countries, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan 3 . If we turn our attention to the Middle East or West Asia, we find a similar situation 
exists with the Jordan River basin, the Nile River basin and the Tigris-Euphrates basin. The Jordan 
River basin, which runs into the Dead Sea, is extremely important to the riparian states of Jordan, 
Syria, Israel and Lebanon 4. The Tigris and Euphrates, both originating in Turkey and flowing 
southwards to the Persian Gulf through Syria and Iraq, concern Syria, Iraq, Turkey and conflict 
regarding dams, water quantity and water quality is vital to questions of governance and indeed 
existence of states5. Even the Nile’s waters are divided between nine nations; “Egypt, Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire.6” Thus, the question of resource 
sharing and hydropolitics, which I will elaborate on further in the theoretical background section, 
is essential to those concerned not only with South Asia but also with the possibility of conflict, 
regime stability and war.  
 
3 K. D. W. Nandalal and K. W. Hipel, ‘Strategic Decision Support for Resolving Conflict over Water Sharing 
among Countries along the Syr Darya River in the Aral Sea Basin’, Journal of Water Resources Planning and 
Management 133, no. 4 (1 July 2007): 289–99, https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9496(2007)133:4(289). 
4 Stephen M Woolwine, ‘Water and Conflict in the Middle East : A Monograph’ (School of Advanced Military 
Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1997 1996), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=700831. 
5 Woolwine. 
6 Now known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
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 The relevancy of the issue of water scarcity within South Asia must not be understated 
either. To understand the pressing nature of how climate change will impact the states of India, 
China, and Bangladesh and their relations with each other, it is vital to understand the complex 
geography and history that underscores their present situation. The Hindu-Kush Himalayan region 
(HKH) is home to one of the “largest storehouses of fresh water in the world”, with the Himalayan 
mountains supplying water for major rivers.7 The three main Himalayan rivers, the Brahmaputra, 
the Ganges, the Indus all “arise within 300 km from each other in the Himalayan glaciers”.8 Whilst 
the Ganges has its origins in the Himalayan mountains, the other two rivers originate in the Trans-
Himalayan Tibetan region. The Indus then sets a west-facing course to the Arabian Sea while the 
Ganges and Brahmaputra journey to the Bay of Bengal in the eastern part of the Indian 
subcontinent. 9  
 
Figure 1. “Map of rivers of Asia”10 
 
7 Richa Singh, ‘Trans-Boundary Water Politics and Conflicts in South Asia: Towards 'Water for Peace’’, Center for 
Democracy and Social Action, n.d., 46. 
8 Singh. 
9 Singh. 
10 Shabeh ul Hasson et al., ‘Seasonal Cycle of Precipitation over Major River Basins in South and Southeast Asia: A 
Review of the CMIP5 Climate Models Data for Present Climate and Future Climate Projections’, Atmospheric 
Research 180 (11 May 2016): 42–63, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.atmosres.2016.05.008. 
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When combined, these three rivers form the Himalayan river system which carries on 
average 1200 cubic kilometres of water each day.11 When the Meghna or Barak river is included, 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna constitutes the third largest river system in the world.12 Thus, 
there are four main river basins in South Asia: the Indus, the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the 
Meghna. These transboundary rivers flow across eight countries; China, Myanmar, Afghanistan, 
India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Pakistan. The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) system 
consists of the catchment areas of three aforementioned river systems flowing through India, 
Bhutan, China, Nepal and Bangladesh.13 It has 1350 billion cubic meters of annual discharge with 
a total drainage area of 1.75 million km2; of this drainage area, 62% lies in India’s northeast, 8% 
in Bangladesh 18% in Tibet which is governed by China, with the remaining 12% lying in Bhutan 
and Nepal.14 
The Ganges in particular is both strategically and culturally important in South Asia; the 
Mughal, Gupta and Magadha civilizations were founded on the Gangetic plains.15 Even more 
historically significant, the Ganges River witnessed the birth of Hinduism, Jainism, Sikhism, and 
Buddhism. In more modern times, the Ganges Basin is of huge economic importance to 
Bangladesh as an “agrarian and riverine country” that is dependent on the river water to supply its 
population with water for consumption, irrigation, fisheries, transport and biodiversity 
 
11 Singh, ‘Trans-Boundary Water Politics and Conflicts in South Asia: Towards 'Water for Peace’’. 
12 Singh. 
13 Sudhir Pratap Singh and Haslinda Abdullah, ‘Historic Arguments and Transboundary Disputes on Water Conflict 
in South Asia’, The Journal of Defence and Security 7, no. 1 (2016): 40-56,III.  
14 Singh and Abdullah. 
15 Dilip Kumar, ‘River Ganges – Historical, Cultural and Socioeconomic Attributes’, Aquatic Ecosystem Health & 
Management 20, no. 1–2 (3 April 2017): 8–20, https://doi.org/10.1080/14634988.2017.1304129. 
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conservation.16 India certainly relies heavily on the Ganges River as well, with the rapid 
urbanization and economic growth predicted to only increase demand for water which will reduce 
water that is available to be used for agriculture.17  
  
 
Figure 2. Diagram of the Ganges River, the major tributaries, and location of water 18 
The Brahmaputra River, on the other hand, sustains four countries in particular; China 
(through Tibet) with 50.5% of the total basin, India with 33.6% of the total basin, Bangladesh with 
7.8% and Bhutan with 8.1%.19 For India and China, the Brahmaputra flows through an area of 
 
16 Jason Miklian et al., ‘Water Scarcity in Bangladesh: Transboundary Rivers, Conflict and Cooperation’ (Peace 
Research Institute Oslo, 2013), 
https://www.academia.edu/10828905/Water_Scarcity_in_Bangladesh_Transboundary_Rivers_Conflict_and_Cooper
ation. 
17 Ana Mijic, ‘The Ganges River Basin in India’, Imperial College London, Undated, 
http://www.imperial.ac.uk/grantham/research/resources-and-pollution/water-security-and-flood-risk/the-ganges-
river-basin-in-india/. 
18 Kumar, ‘River Ganges – Historical, Cultural and Socioeconomic Attributes’. 
19 ‘Transboundary Water Cooperation over the Brahmaputra River: Legal Political Economy Analysis of Current 
and Future Potential Cooperation’, Water Diplomacy: Making Water Cooperation Work Project Report (The Hague 
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contested territory whilst Bangladesh “faces human security pressures in this basin that will be 
magnified by upstream river practices.”20  
This thesis will be exploring the relatively lesser studied dynamics of Indo-Bangladesh 
water cooperation and Indo-Chinese water relations through the lens of hydropolitics. I will not be 
including Pakistan as there has been a large body of literature devoted to the negotiations that 
spawned the Indus Water Treaty, the benefits and drawbacks of the said treaty. This thesis aims to 
enrich the existing and burgeoning field of hydropolitics by focusing on the relations India has 
with a weaker, lesser riparian state like Bangladesh as well as a newly powerful and ambitious 
upper riparian such as China. In the next section, I will discuss the theoretical underpinnings of 
my analysis of factors behind contentious borders between India and Bangladesh as well as India 
and China. In the final section, I will piece together the causes of contention and put forward my 
predictions of how the relationship between India and its neighbouring countries will proceed in 
the context of water scarcity.  
 
c. Theoretical Framework 
 
The study of hydropolitics and transboundary resource sharing 
 
Before delving deeper into the topic, it is important to establish the nature of the subject at 
hand. Hydropolitics was a term coined by John Waterbury in 1979 and relates to the potential for 
 
Institute for Global Justice, August 2017), https://www.siwi.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Brahmaputra-basin-
report-final_design.pdf. 
20 Nilanthi Samaranayake, Satu Limaye, and Joel Wuthnow, ‘Water Resource Competition in the Brahmaputra 
River Basin: China, India, and Bangladesh’ (Center for Naval Analyses, May 2016), 
https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/cna-brahmaputra-study-2016.pdf. 
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conflict and violence to “erupt over international waters”.21 22 According to Arun Elhance 23, 
hydropolitics can be defined as “the systematic study of conflict and cooperation between states 
over water resources that transcend international borders.”24 Indeed, the issue of water security 
and the resulting interstate interactions, fall under the remit of hydropolitical interactions. 
Interactions can entail either tension or cooperation; war and a deterioration of diplomatic 
relations, or even countries working together. Instances of hydropolitical interactions are high in 
hotspots that are already water-stressed such as the Ganges-Brahmaputra basin and the Indus basin. 
Hydropolitical interactions are more likely in areas with “low to medium levels of national power”, 
between extreme upstream and extreme downstream countries as well as in economies 
characterized by being “rural and agricultural[ly] dependent” and also lower or middle income 
nations.25 This explains where interactions, be it positive or negative, are likely to occur but does 
not address the question of why and how.  
Understanding the causes conflict between states regarding transboundary water 
resources 
 
Whilst a relatively novel subsect of the field of political science and international relations, 
there is certainly no dearth of academic thought and articles on the causes of conflict between 
riparian states. Most of the literature mentions the Middle East, Southeast, Central and South Asia 
as the major ‘hotspots’ where hydropolitical interactions and by extension, hydropolitical conflicts 
 
21 John Waterbury, Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley, 1st ed. (Syracuse University Press, 1979), 
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015002133646. 
22 Subash Prasad Rai et al., ‘Hydropolitics in Transboundary Water Conflict and Cooperation’, in River System 
Analysis and Management, ed. Nayan Sharma (Singapore: Springer, 2017), 353–68, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-
981-10-1472-7_19. 
23 Arun Elhance is an assistant professor of geography at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and a 
senior fellow at the International Peace Academy in New York.  
24 Rai et al., ‘Hydropolitics in Transboundary Water Conflict and Cooperation’. 
25 Water Scarcity Atlas, ‘Hydro-Political Interactions’, Water Scarcity Atlas, n.d., 
https://waterscarcityatlas.org/hydro-political-interactions/. 
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will occur. Most of these works are concerned with the ‘scarcity’ aspect of water security, which 
this thesis will elaborate on. In order to understand which factors were significant in analyzing the 
relationships between riparian states,  as well as which exacerbating factor due to climate change 
to study (in this context, water scarcity), it was important to understand the scholarship behind the 
water-conflict-international relations nexus. It was also vital to understand that some factors which 
I previously considered including in my analysis turned out to be nonsignificant determinants of 
conflict between riparian states.  
Wagner Costa Ribeiro and Fernanda Mello Sant’Anna discuss water security and the 
resulting conflicts between states over this issue in ‘Water security and interstate cooperation and 
conflict’.26 The authors discuss the creation of the concept of ‘water security’ in international 
relations, which was developed by the Copenhagen School affiliated with the Copenhagen Peace 
Research Institute (COPRI). The article credits the studies of “Buzan (1991), Buzan et al. (1998) 
and Buzan and Waever”, that incorporated new thematic areas and actors into the field of security 
studies. These aforementioned authors have defined securitization as a “process of extreme 
politicization of an issue that comes to be seen as a threatening situation, which therefore requires 
the use of any means necessary to contain it, including those above the usual rules of the political 
game.”  
‘Water, Conflict and Cooperation’ by Carius, Dabelko and Wolf distils the major 
connections between water and conflict into three main points. First, access to adequate water 
supplies; second, water’s role in livelihood loss; thirdly and finally, the lack of adequate resource 
 
26 Wagner Costa Ribeiro and Fernanda Mello Sant’Anna, ‘Water Security and Interstate Conflict and Cooperation - 
(Seguretat Hídrica i Conflicte i Cooperació Interestatals)’, Documents d’Anàlisi Geogràfica 60, no. 3 (1 October 
2014): 573–96, https://doi.org/10.5565/rev/dag.150. 
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management of water. 27 The authors of the policy brief argue that conflict tends to occur when the 
dispute “involve[s] access to water of adequate quantity and quality”. Even if the water supply is 
not heavily limited, if there exists many different users and uses, the resource can become highly 
contested. Firstly, they argue that limited access to sufficient water supplies of good quality 
precipitates conflict due to threats to health which aggravates water scarcity. Therefore, degraded 
water quality actually can cause “potentially violent disputes.”28 In the instance that water supplies 
for regions that are widely irrigated decrease in quantity and/or quality, receiving cities and even 
neighboring countries face the prospect of politically destabilizing migrations. Their second 
argument is more straightforward; with agriculture sustained by water, people are often forced to 
migrate due to “lack of water, sudden droughts and floods, infrastructure construction (e.g. dams), 
pollution disasters, or livelihood loss”.29 As aforementioned, local and incoming communities 
often face tension when sharing already scarce resources. Many civil wars that have started in 
South Asia and Latin America as well as Africa have their roots in livelihood loss. Finally, their 
argument that the maladroit way water resources are “governed and managed” actually cause 
conflict rather than the absence or shortage of water. They point to a shortage of efficient water 
institutions, sufficient administrative capacity, no transparency in addition to “fragmented 
institutional structures, and a lack of necessary infrastructure.”30 The authors emphasize the deeply 
political and bureaucratic nature of water management which tends to disaggregated decision-
making, resulting in competing claims from different sectors. More importantly, the policy brief 
underlines the necessity of consulting local communities and water users to ensure local rights and 
 
27 Alexander Carius, Geoffrey D. Dabelko, and Aaron T. Wolf, ‘Water, Conflict, and Cooperation’, ECSP Report 
(Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center, 2004), 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/ecspr10_unf-caribelko.pdf. 
28 Carius, D. Dabelko, and T. Wolf. 
29 Carius, D. Dabelko, and T. Wolf. 
30 Carius, D. Dabelko, and T. Wolf. 
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practices are taken into consideration when discussions on transboundary water resources are 
being had to avoid the kind of protests that occurred in 2000 after the privatization of the water 
utility in Cochabamba, Bolivia. However, the policy brief also provides a view on how water can 
be a key to peace. Given the shared desire for development in the context of mutual water stressed 
riparian states, water can become a tool for effective diplomacy. The example of the Nile Basin 
Initiative is employed; the riparian states involved were motivated to engage in “tough, protracted 
negotiations.” 31 Water can also be the channel that breaks the diplomatic impasse; even if conflict 
continues on other issues, cooperation over water can continue. They cite the examples of the Indus 
River Commission and the Mekong Committee. Ultimately, they conclude that a forum for 
transboundary stakeholders in the Global South should be formed by the United Nations, in 
conjunction with improving institutional capacity and technical expertise.  
In a similar vein, ‘The Future of Transboundary Water Conflicts’ by Nincic and Weiss also 
discuss three factors of the international context that have the most impact on the outcome of 
relative water scarcity. 32 Nincic and Weiss state that the three features are the overall tenor of 
relations between riparian nations, the “existence or absence of an institutional context for water 
management”, and the balance of power between riparian parties. They note that as Thomas 
Homer-Dixon posits, “although shortages of nonrenewable resources infrequently produce 
conflict, surface water may be the exception.”33 The article also discusses the problems of “relying 
on past regularities”, due to the assumption of the linear logic behind them. In the context of 
climate change, this is extremely true. They note that if “non-linear effects of climate change drive 
water scarcity much beyond historical norms, bargaining among co-riparians might leave less 
 
31 Carius, D. Dabelko, and T. Wolf. 
32 Miroslav Nincic and Matthew Weiss, ‘The Future of Transboundary Water Conflicts’, Political Science Quarterly 
131, no. 4 (2016): 717–48, https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12531. 
33 Nincic and Weiss. 
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room for compromises.”34 This means that downstream riparians might oppose diversion of the 
water resource and infrastructure proposals, such as dams and barrages, with more vehemence. 
Therefore, if a country fears undue benefits being accrued to their contiguous riparian it could 
incentivize that state to renege on their obligations under any treaties.  
The article also discusses how unclear and “imprecise” treaty obligations could actually 
hurt cooperation as disagreements described with “imprecise language” are more intransigent 
when water scarcity increases. In addition, they postulate that in the context of growing scarcity, 
concerns regarding “quantitative water shares” or the allocation of water is likely to cause conflict. 
Take for instance, the infrastructure projects like dams that add to the likelihood of conflict. Most 
interestingly, they pose three scenarios in the instance of water shortages when the supply-demand 
gap can only be solved using “actions affecting other countries”. First that there is “cooperative 
agreement on allocations, the second is an attempt to improve water access at the expense of co-
riparian(s), and the third is an unresolved situation in which conflict is avoided while cooperation 
seems unattainable”.35 They argue that the scholarship points to three factors in the international 
context which influence the outcome of relative water scarcity the most; the tenor of relations 
between riparian states; the presence or lack thereof of an “institutional context for water 
management”, and thirdly, the balance of power between countries. The paper argues that having 
historically friendly diplomatic dialogue does increase trust between the parties that the other side 
will follow through with its commitments. They note that countries that generally were cooperative 
also cooperated over water and countries that were hostile previously continued this stance over 
discussions on water resources. As for the balance of power, Nincic and Weiss believed that 
 
34 Nincic and Weiss. 
35 Nincic and Weiss. 
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conflicts over resources tended to occur if either side anticipates being able to use force to achieve 
its aims. They propound that both “large power disparities and near equality infrequently produce 
conflict.” What they do believe multiplies the possibility of conflict over transboundary resources 
is when the “lagging party’s capabilities are improving while it is unhappy with the status quo”. 
For example, when the party is being deprived of its fair share of the joint resources. Finally, the 
existence of institutions that help with distributional problems, as well as providing structure for 
joint decision making, stabilizing mutual expectations and provide each nation with the other’s 
“capabilities and intentions.” They concur with John Mearsheimer’s conclusion that resource 
conflict is most likely to occur when there is both resource scarcity and inadequate institutional 
capacity to deal with that scarcity. However, they iterate that institutions must not be considered 
in isolation; should the balance of power between riparians change, the formerly disadvantaged 
country could attempt to challenge the previous agreements, and perhaps by force.  
 Yoffe, Wolf and Giardono similarly put forward arguments on why conflict and 
conversely, cooperation occurs in transboundary basin discussions in “Conflict and Cooperation 
over International Freshwater Resources: Indicators of Basins at Risk”.36 The authors created a 15 
point ‘Basins At Risk’ Scale of Intensity of Conflict and Cooperation, ranging from +7 where the 
nations merged voluntarily into one state over water; 0 representing netural or non-significant 
events and -7 being the most intense form conflict, meaning a formal declaration of war over the 
resource.37 They focused their discussion on investigating the validity of theories linking water to 
international conflict as well as which basins were likely to be at risk for future conflict over 
transboundary freshwater resources. In their results, they found no events at either extreme end of 
 
36 Shim Yoffe, Aaron T. Wolf, and Mark Giordano, ‘Conflict and Cooperation Over International Freshwater 
Resources: Indicators of Basins at Risr1’, JAWRA Journal of the American Water Resources Association 39, no. 5 
(2003): 1109–26, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1752-1688.2003.tb03696.x. 
37 Yoffe, Wolf, and Giordano. 
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the intensity scale; no formal declaration of war over a shared resource nor voluntary unification 
into a singular nation over water. They studied the period from 1948 to 1999 and found that nations 
tended to cooperate, including signing treaties, rather than engage in conflict over water, especially 
violent conflict. Of the 1831 events they included in their study, only 28% were conflictive and 
67% were cooperative, with the rest of the events coding as neutral. The events generally were 
dominated by water quantity, joint management, hydropower and infrastructure. The events that 
demonstrated the most conflict were solely regarding “quantity and infrastructure” which are two 
intertwined issues.  
As for factors which were significantly associated with cooperation or conflict, they found 
overall level of friendship or hostility among riparian states to play a large role. They also found 
that at the regional level, countries could have friendlier relations over water than they did 
generally which suggests that the drivers of conflict over non-water issues are different than the 
drivers of conflict over water. They also found that infrastructure development and institutional 
mechanisms have an impact on international water conflict. The likelihood and indeed intensity of 
conflict within a particular basin rises as the “magnitude or amount of change in physical and 
institutional systems exceeds the capacity to absorb that change.” An example of an extreme 
change in the physical structure of the basin might be the infrastructure of a large dam or a water 
development project , perhaps designed to generate hydropower. The relationship between these 
two variables is significant; treaties in high dam density basins mitigate conflict. In fact, high dam 
density basins with treaties show “significantly higher levels of cooperation than did nontreaty 
basins” (with 41% difference). This difference in levels of cooperation were not because these 
countries had a cooperative relationship to begin with; they found that average relations concerning 
of water between these dyads during the three years before the signing of the treaty was “somewhat 
16 
more conflictive than in general”. Once a freshwater treaty was signed, there was an increase in 
cooperation and gradually, more treaties were signed. The authors also found that rapid changes 
in institutional systems occurred when internationalization of basins occurred. For instance, South 
Asia during the collapse of the British raj as well as in Eastern Europe and Central Asia during the 
fall of the Soviet Union witnessed much greater levels of conflict as compared to other regions in 
the same time period.  
A very interesting discovery regarding factors that did not have a significant influence on 
international conflict over freshwater resources was that government regime type was not a useful 
indicator of whether or not two states would cooperate or not over their shared resources. They 
found that governments “experiencing disruption or transition”, such as regimes that possessed a 
mix of autocratic and democratic transition, are no more aggressive over water than other water 
types. Contrastingly, “countries at the democratic end of the spectrum tended to exhibit less 
cooperation over water than did other regime types”. The only notable exception was that “the few 
sets of neighbors with the highest possible heterogeneity” (countries with regime types that were 
drastically different from each other) appeared to have the least cooperative relationships. Overall, 
they conclude that the most important indicators of basins that had the tendency for future conflict 
are basins with high population density (>100/km2), low per capita GDP, countries with overall 
hostile relations (BAR Scale <-1.0), politically active minority groups that could catalyze 
“internationalization”, the presence of large dams or water development projects and “limited or 
no freshwater treaties”.  
 
 As for the questions of whether institutions truly mitigated international water conflict, 
authors Tir and Stinnett note that the “propensity for conflicts over water to escalate depends on 
17 
whether the river in question is governed by a formal agreement.”38 The study focuses on 
establishing the argument that institutional design is what determines the ability of river treaties to 
adapt to the rise in water stress caused by climate change. Tir and Stinnett propound four particular 
features of institutions help mitigate international water related conflict; “provisions for joint 
monitoring, conflict resolution, treaty enforcement, and the delegation of authority to 
intergovernmental organization.” The more the treaties include these mechanisms, the better 
equipped they will be to handle conflicts that result from the predicted water scarcity and water 
stress in the future. Their empirical study tests the relationship between institutional design and 
the occurrence of conflict using a sample of treaties regarding rivers since 1950; the results show 
that the likelihood of conflict does increase with the occurrence of water scarcity. However, the 
authors note that “highly institutionalized river agreements are effective at steering riparian state 
interactions away from conflict.” They observe that more transparency and data sharing helps allay 
fears that the other riparian state is “violating the treaty”. This formal monitoring aspect of treaties 
becomes even more crucial if climate change acts to change total annual river flow or flow during 
the dry months; parties are able to differentiate the climate change related effects from other 
riparian states’ actions, with information symmetry. Hence, signatories of such treaties could be 
disincentivized from cheating due to the much greater probability of getting ‘caught’.  
The formal conflict management aspect is also important in coping with disagreement 
between signatories. Such methods of dispute resolution should assist in addressing various 
sources of noncompliance, incorporating those affiliated with “anticipated consequences of 
 
38 Jaroslav Tir and Douglas M Stinnett, ‘Weathering Climate Change: Can Institutions Mitigate International Water 
Conflict?’, Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1 (1 January 2012): 211–25, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343311427066. 
18 
climate change.”39 By increasing the costs of noncompliance, dispute settlement features in treaties 
have the potential to heighten countries’ compliance levels. Moreover, including conflict 
management institutions also helps dispel concerns over the signatories’ precise obligations under 
the treaty. Should an unforeseen event occur due to climate change, say decreased flow or more 
erratic water variability, a third-party arbitration panel, court or even “informal mediation through 
a secretariat or intergovernmental body can clarify the terms of a treaty”. Thirdly, enforcement 
provisions aid the ability of the treaty to stop and mitigate disputes in various ways. These 
provisions reduce transaction costs of implementing punishments for cheaters which once again 
amplifies the costs of non-compliance and acts as a deterrence for signatories inclined to violate 
the treaty. Therefore, the decentralized nature of the self-enforcement of an agreement by its 
signatories is able to be reinforced. Additionally, because these provisions are sanctioned by the 
agreement any enforcement according to the rules laid out in the treaty is likely to be seen as 
‘legitimate’ rather than a retaliation by a disgruntled party.  
Finally, the reputational consequences that signatories risk by not abiding by the treaty 
deters violations and paves the way to mitigating transboundary conflict. The fourth aspect, 
intergovernmental bodies, is particularly salient in matters of climate change. These bodies 
become a tool to facilitate diplomacy and dialogue over the clarity of obligations specified by an 
agreement. Notably, Tir and Stinnett discuss the paramount nature of technical committees. 
Conflict management is made easier when the “water experts, engineers and regulators from 
member states” address problems in a scientific rather than political manner. Institutional capacity 
is also heightened by “coordinating national efforts through a centralized administrative structure 
 
39 Take for example, the temptation one riparian has of trying to increase withdrawal rates to offset the water 
shortage from years long dry periods.  
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and by pooling members’ technical capacities.” In precis, river treaties that are enhanced by these 
four features of institutional design will more adroitly mitigate transboundary water conflict.  
Last but not least, we turn to the concept of ‘hydrohegemony’ as a factor causing contention 
between riparian parties. Zeitoun and Allan explore this concept in their work ‘Applying 
hegemony and power theory to transboundary water analysis.’40 The authors emphasize the role 
of hegemony, both power and political-economy processes, in determining the tenor of interstate 
transboundary water relations. The paper iterates that ignoring the fact that power has a large hand 
in the management and allocation of transboundary water would be irrational; water acts to defy 
gravity in these cases and flows upstream to “money and power”. They put forward three concepts 
of power, which I will utilize in my analysis of the case studies. One aspect of power is ‘hard’ or 
‘structural’ power, which is afforded by a state’s riparian position.41 The second dimension is 
‘bargaining power’ or who controls the rules of the game; which country decides “what kind of 
decisions will be taken” and which will not even be discussed. This way, the weaker party is stuck 
in a relationship where their demands for changing the status quo allocations can be silenced before 
they are even voiced. The last aspect of power they describe is the ability of the hegemon (or the 
extremely dominant power) to depoliticize or institutionalize their vision so that it appears so 
normalized that these hegemonic ideas are not even contested. An example would be the Carribean 
or African states accepting their subjugated status in relation to Europe as only natural; the weaker 
actor might not even try to challenge certain allocations due to the representation of the state of 
affairs as the ‘order of things’.  
 
 
40 Mark Zeitoun and J. A. Allan, ‘Applying Hegemony and Power Theory to Transboundary Water Analysis’, Water 
Policy 10, no. S2 (November 2008): 3–12, http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.bu.edu/10.2166/wp.2008.203. 
41 An upper riparian state has more control over water flow and variability while the downstream country is left 
more or less at the mercy of their upstream counterpart.  
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Understanding the exacerbating factors of hydropolitical tensions 
In ‘Assessment of transboundary river basins for potential hydro-political tensions’, De 
Stefano, Petersen-Perlman, Sproles, Eynard, and Wolf conduct a global survey of the 
transboundary watersheds to identify regions that have a greater likelihood of witnessing 
hydropolitical tensions over the upcoming decade.42 They examine two main issues 
simultaneously; the inherent stresses of development and the mitigating role institutions have, and 
maps out the risk of potential hydropolitical tensions where basins might not be well equipped to 
manage disputes over transboundary water resources when the construction of new dams and 
diversions’ occur. They echo the contribution of earlier literature on the importance of creating 
institutional capacity, through treaties and river basin organizations, which is “considered to 
contribute to the decrease of the likelihood of hydropolitical conflict”.43 They note that institutional 
resilience can be assessed by the presence of three factors; a) the existence of a water treaty, b) the 
presence of a river basin organization and c) the existence of conflict resolution mechanisms. More 
importantly, they note six factors that could exacerbate these hydropolitical tensions in the future, 
including “changes in terrestrial water storage, projected changes in water variability, per capita 
gross national income, domestic and international armed conflicts, and recent history of disputes 
over transboundary waters.” The focus on water variability and water availability as indicators of 
water scarcity becomes especially prudent when examining the three countries in question; 
Bangladesh, India, and China.  
 
42 L. De Stefano et al., ‘Assessment of Transboundary River Basins for Potential Hydro-Political Tensions’, Global 
Environmental Change 45 (1 July 2017): 35–46, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2017.04.008. 
43 De Stefano et al. 
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Though these approaches are useful, I will in the following subsection detail which of these 
factors I believe are particularly salient in analyzing causes of contention and predicting the 
outcome of the India’s relationship with its co-riparian states.  
 
d. The Argument  
 
Applications to the analysis of India’s relations with neighboring states 
 
Basin Name Riparian States 
Brahmaputra China, India, Bangladesh 
Ganges India, Bangladesh  
 
 My analysis is three pronged; first, I ascertain why borders in the river basins of the Indus, 
Ganges and Brahmaputra are deemed contentious by assessing the presence of the following 
factors; the state of social stability within the country44, as well as flawed treaties45, contentious 
state of infrastructure, tenor of interstate relations between riparian states, lack of institutional 
resilience,  and finally, the power asymmetry between riparian nations (typically indicated by the 
presence of a hydrohegemon). Then, I make the prediction that the states will respond in one of 
three ways when faced with water scarcity, as postulated by Nincic and Weiss; states can either 
cooperate, or seek to improve their water access at the expense of their co-riparian(s) or a situation 
where conflict is avoided but “cooperation seems unattainable”.46 In other words, a “situation of 
unstable stasis.”47  Thus, the case studies will act as proofs to the argument I have laid out here. 
 
44 This will include certain armed minority groups that are ethnonationalist for example and threaten the survival of 
the state as well as the strength of the state’s capacity to subdue them. The Kashmiris are a good example in the 
India-Pakistan dyad.  
45 ‘Flawed’ in this context is taken to mean imprecise, and filled with technical jargon, and without stipulations time 
frames for implementation as well as  
46 Nincic and Weiss, ‘The Future of Transboundary Water Conflicts’. 
47 Nincic and Weiss. 
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Based on the literature, I will argue that India will cooperate, to engage in stay in ‘unstable stasis’ 






Lack of Institutional 
Resilience 
Lack of conflict resolution mechanisms 
Lack of river basin organizations 
Treaties lack monitoring to ensure each party gets its fair share 
Lack of water treaties (precise, without technical jargon) 
Inadequate response to physical changes caused by infrastructure building  
Lack of inclusion of intergovernmental organizations  
 
Contentious State of 
Infrastructure 
 
High density of dams in the basin 
High density of infrastructure (without consultation of the other party & 
affected local citizens) 
No clearly defined legal rights over water resources  
Significant adverse environmental impacts on the other riparian nation(s) 
Lack of Social Stability 
within the countries 
 
River basin located in contested territory 
State capabilities of managing insurgencies 
Large numbers of displaced population due to actions of another riparian 
state 
 
Overall hostile relations 
between the riparian states 
Historically tense or hostile relations on non-water and water related issues  
Asymmetrical balance of power 
Neither presence of a hydrohegemon nor similar levels of power symmetry 
Existence of disgruntled, previously disadvantaged power who could 






I will examine the impact of water scarcity on the relations India has with its neighbors from 
the lens of three river basins; the Indus, the Ganges and the Brahmaputra. I have organized the 
case studies according to which river basin they are situated in rather than the individual borders 
due to the interconnected nature of transboundary rivers. The very structure of a river is one 
continuous flow from its origin until it meets the sea; it is therefore impossible to discuss a lower 
riparian party’s concerns without preceding and succeeding analysis of the middle and upper 
riparian states’ intentions, hopes and worries.  The first section does the groundwork of laying out 
the Within the ‘second’ section which deals with the study of the two river basins, each country 
example is broken down into subsections where the varying factors causing contention between 
the countries are analyzed. The third and final section discusses how these impact the relationship 






















Section 2: Case Studies of Contention 
The Ganges-Brahmaputra Basin 
 
Ganges River  
 
 
Figure 3. Map of Ganges basin and its major tributaries.48 
 
Main River Basin: Ganges Basin 
 
Tributaries : Tamsa, Ghaghara, Son, Gandaki, Kosi, Bhagirathi-Hooghly 
 
Upper riparian: India 
 
Lower riparian: Bangladesh 
 
 
48 Jatin Anand et al., ‘Regional Scale Hydrologic Modeling for Prediction of Water Balance, Analysis of Trends in 
Streamflow and Variations in Streamflow: The Case Study of the Ganga River Basin’, Journal of Hydrology: 
Regional Studies 16 (13 March 2018): 32–53, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejrh.2018.02.007. 
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Treaties negotiated: Ganges Waters Agreement (1977)49 
 
Treaties signed: Joint Declaration (1972), Bangladesh-India Treaty on sharing of Ganges Waters 
(1996)  
 
Organizations formed: Joint Rivers Commission (1972) 
 
Dams constructed: Farakka Barrage (construction began 1962, operations began 21 April 1975) 
 
Historical Background  
India-Bangladesh relations 
 
 India and Bangladesh are deeply connected as bordering nations on the subcontinent in a 
myriad of aspects. Culturally, linguistically, geographically, politically and historically, these 
affinities run deep. Before the Partition of  ‘British India’ into Pakistan and India, East Bengal was 
actually part of India. Post-1947, East Bengal was absorbed into Pakistan as the eastern wing of 
the nation, and was re-named ‘East Pakistan’ in 1955.50 It was only in 1971 after the Bangladeshi 
War of Independence that it officially became known as Bangladesh. Despite this shared history, 
the bilateral relations are not and have not always been flourishing. India actually played a 
significant role in the creation of Bangladesh as then Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, gave 
military support to the Bangladeshi Liberation Army or Mukti Bahini to defeat West Pakistani rule. 
This of course informally established India’s clear role as the hegemon of the South Asia to 
Pakistan’s detriment.  
 
49 This agreement was negotiated but never formally signed.  





 Relations between the two nations were definitely friendly in the aftermath of the 
Bangladeshi Liberation War, which can be evinced in the statements made at the time by prime 
ministers of both countries. The Bangladeshi Prime Minister, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, even gave 
an address the Lok Sabha in 1972, stating that the two countries shared “common ideals and 
sacrifices” and would forge a relationship “based on the principles of mutual respect for each 
other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs, equality and 
mutual benefit.”51 Indeed, Bangladesh was India’s largest single recipient of aid from the period 
of 1971 to 1975.52 This cordial relationship soon deteriorated rapidly after the assassination of 
Mujibur Rahman in August 1975 with General Ziaur Rahman’s military regime coming to power. 
The ‘anti-India’ card became the most effective way to demonstrate nationalist credentials, and 
most parties made full use of this with the exception of the Awami League.  
 All successive governments until the restoration of democracy in 1990 following Ziaur 
Rahman’s government were “mostly based on pro-Islam and pro-West determinants and were 
almost anti-Indian.”53 The Awami League governments had more “moderate democratic and 
secular nationalist elements have always maintained cordial relations with India” but their political 
rivals such as the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) had not always been this positive. 54 In October 
2001, the BNP took power alongside its allies Jamaat-e-Islami and Islamic Oikya Jote, which had 
hardline Islamist ideologies which featured heavily in the administration’s foreign policy. Thus, 
mistrust and suspicion flowered in India-Bangladesh relations. 55 This lead to friction between the 
 
51 Kadurugamuwa. 
52 Md. Abul Kashem and Md. Shariful Islam, ‘Narendra Modi’s Bangladesh Policy and India–Bangladesh 
Relations: Challenges and Possible Policy Responses’, India Quarterly 72, no. 3 (1 September 2016): 250–67, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928416655409. 
53 Kadurugamuwa, ‘Sharing of Trans-Boundary River Waters in South Asia; Geopolitics and Beyond’, 2014. 
54 Kadurugamuwa. 
55 Kashem and Islam, ‘Narendra Modi’s Bangladesh Policy and India–Bangladesh Relations’. 
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Prime Minister of Bangladesh and BNP leader Begum Khaleda Zia who “pledged to free 
Bangladesh from the shackles of Indian domination” imposed upon Bangladesh by the Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Peace with India because of the actions of Prime Minister Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman.56 This anti-Indian sentiment of  Bangladeshi foreign policy was reversed during 
the 1996 to 2001 period which saw the signing of the 1996 Ganges water sharing treaty, which 
was valid for thirty years. After this period of friendly cooperative relations between Congress and 
the Awami League, the inauguration of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in India in 
1998 thwarted the rapprochement of Bangladesh-India relations. The BJP actually focused its 1998 
campaign on the thorny issue of migration from Bangladesh.57 The party even went so far as to 
associate its foreign policy approach to Bangladesh with the issues of “cross border movement, 
the ISI and Al-Qaeda”.58 Thus, the relationship reached a historic low during the 2001-2006 BNP 
government’s tenure. 
Once again, this reversed in 2009 when Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League where Hasina 
took decisive steps to strengthen the bilateral relationship. Among them were allaying India’s fears 
regarding India’s security concerns by “expelling the Northeastern insurgents who had taken 
shelter in the Bangladeshi territory” as well as “encouraging greater connectivity between India 
and Bangladesh.”59 The tenure of Manmohan Singh, then Prime Minister of India, and Sheikh 
Hasina saw a series of protocols being signed but without agreement on issues such as the 
Bangladesh-India water sharing issue on the Teesta60. This was largely due to opposition in 
domestic Indian politics from politicians such as Mamata Banerjee who refused to accompany 
 
56 Kadurugamuwa, ‘Sharing of Trans-Boundary River Waters in South Asia; Geopolitics and Beyond’, 2014. 
57 Sinderpal Singh, ‘“Border Crossings and Islamic Terrorists”: Representing Bangladesh in Indian Foreign Policy 
During the BJP Era’, India Review 8, no. 2 (1 June 2009): 144–62, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736480902901053. 
58 Singh. 
59 Kadurugamuwa, ‘Sharing of Trans-Boundary River Waters in South Asia; Geopolitics and Beyond’, 2014. 
60 The Teesta River is a tributary of the Brahmaputra River. 
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Manmohan Singh on his visit to Dhaka to sign the Teesta water treaty with Bangladesh as she 
claimed it was ‘detrimental’ to West Bengal’s interests. The present relations between India and 




Figure 4. Map of the Ganges River Basin. 61 
 
The river Ganga or Ganges river begins in the Central Himalayas with an altitude of 7010 
meters, extending into the Gangetic plains and then flows into the Indian Ocean at the Bay of 
 
61 GRID-Arendal, ‘The Ganges River Basin | GRID-Arendal’, 2015, https://www.grida.no/resources/6685. 
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Bengal.62 The Ganges river is transboundary, with a total length of roughly 2600 km and a total 
catchment area of 1,087,000km2.63 The river basin is spread across four countries; India, Nepal, 
China (through its Tibet region) and Bangladesh. India receives the greatest portion (79%) of the 
total basin area, with Bangladesh being the extreme downstream riparian and has around 4% of 
the basin area which actually represents 37% of Bangladesh’s total area.64 The southwest monsoon 
defined by its “high temperatures, heavy rainfall and strong seasonal variations” heavily influences 
the water resources and hydrological cycle of the basin.65 The months of June to October are 
typically the ‘wet season’ which witnesses frequent flooding whereas November to May are the 
‘dry season’ characterized by water scarcity. Almost paradoxically, there is both an abundance of 
water (during monsoons) but reduced flow in the dry seasons due to lower rainfall. It is exactly 
this shortage of water supply downstream during non-monsoon season which leads to “disruption 
to the agriculture, fisheries, forestry and navigation of this region.”66  
Analysis of factors causing contention 
India-Bangladesh 
State of Infrastructure 
Infrastructure built without consultation of the other party  
Any discussion of the contentious relationship between India and Bangladesh would be 
incomplete without the inclusion of the infamous Farakka Barrage to divert a “portion of dry- 
 
62 Kazi Saidur Rahman et al., ‘A Critical Review of the Ganges Water Sharing Arrangement’, Water Policy 21, no. 
2 (27 February 2019): 259–76, https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2019.164. 
63 Rahman et al. 
64 Animesh Gain and Carlo Giupponi, ‘Impact of the Farakka Dam on Thresholds of the Hydrologic Flow Regime 
in the Lower Ganges River Basin (Bangladesh)’, Water 6, no. 8 (15 August 2014): 2501–18, 
https://doi.org/10.3390/w6082501. 
65 J. Caesar et al., ‘Temperature and Precipitation Projections over Bangladesh and the Upstream Ganges, 
Brahmaputra and Meghna Systems’, Environmental Science: Processes & Impacts 17, no. 6 (10 June 2015): 1047–
56, https://doi.org/10.1039/C4EM00650J. 
66 Rahman et al., ‘A Critical Review of the Ganges Water Sharing Arrangement’. 
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season flow and increase the navigability of Calcutta (now Kolkata) port.”67 68. The origins of the 
dispute over the Ganges River began as a result of India’s decision to build a barrage approximately 
16km upstream of Bangladesh in 1951, when Bangladesh was still governed under Pakistan. India 
did not consult Pakistan and did not “take Pakistan’s objections seriously” and carried on the 
project planning process.69 In 1953, India proposed the collaboration of both countries in the 
development of the Ganges River’s water resources. Pakistan countered with an outline of the 
Ganga-Kobadak project in East Pakistan the following year, which included a proposal for 
“irrigating two million acres of land requiring a maximum of 2000 cusecs of water and joint survey 
of [the] upper reaches of Ganges and Brahmaputra”.70 Unfortunately, India objected to this plan. 
The two governments eventually agreed to exchange available data regarding mutually beneficial 
projects and to arrange meetings involving experts from both sides. There were five meetings of 
experts in both 1960-1962 as well as 1968-1969. The last meeting between India and Pakistan at 
the secretary level was conducted in New Delhi from 16 to 17 July 1970. The two countries reached 
an agreement that “the point of delivery of water into East Pakistan would be at Farakka and that 
a body consisting of one representative of each country would be constituted to ensure delivery of 
water” with the water quantity to be decided on later.71 Domestic turmoil ensued in Pakistan with 
Bangladesh’s war for independence in 1971 which meant this decision could not be carried out. 
 
67 The difference between a dam and a barrage is that a barrage is a diversion headwork. Its primary aim is diversion 
of water  have a storage reservoir on its upstream side. A dam is a storage headwork so the primary aim of dam is to 
make a storage reservoir on the dam’s upstream. Dams are generally multipurpose, so they can be also used for 
hydropower, irrigation, flood control and so forth.  
68 Jaya Thakur, ‘India-Bangladesh Trans-Boundary River Management: Understanding the Tipaimukh Dam 
Controversy’ (Observer Research Foundation, 18 January 2020), https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-
bangladesh-trans-boundary-river-management-understanding-the-tipaimukh-dam-controversy-60419/. 
69 Mohammad Abul Kawser and Md. Abdus Samad, ‘Political History of Farakka Barrage and Its Effects on 
Environment in Bangladesh’, Bandung: Journal of the Global South 3, no. 1 (4 January 2016): 16, 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s40728-015-0027-5. 
70 Kawser and Samad. 
71 Kawser and Samad. 
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With no agreement reached on the sharing of the Ganges River waters, and Pakistan’s hands tied 
with the Kashmir question, India was able to follow a strategy of procrastination. This way, 
Pakistan and later Bangladesh was unable to have “any influence in the design or construction of 
the Farakka Barrage.”72 The barrage was completed in 1971, with a total length of about 2240 
meters long. The feeder canal into the Bhagirathi River from the barrage, which is about 25 miles 
in length, was completed in 1975 and the barrage began operations on April 21st 1975. 73 The 
barrage was met with “clamorous protests” in Bangladesh and remains a sore point in bilateral 
discussions on water.74 
Significant adverse environmental and socioeconomic impacts on the other riparian nation(s) 
 
Figure 5. Average dry season flow at Hardinge Bridge. 75 
 
72 Ben Crow, ‘Why Are the Ganges and Brahmaputra Undeveloped?: Politics and Stagnation in the Rivers of South 
Asia’, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 13, no. 4 (1 December 1981): 35–48, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.1981.10409834. 
73 Kishor Uprety and Salman M.A. Salman, ‘Conflict and Cooperation on South Asia’s International Rivers : A 
Legal Perspective’ (World Bank, January 2003), 
https://www.academia.edu/21191815/Conflict_and_cooperation_on_South_Asias_international_rivers_a_legal_pers
pective. 
74 Kimberley Anh Thomas, ‘The Ganges Water Treaty: 20 Years of Cooperation, on India’s Terms’, Water Policy 
19, no. 4 (2017): 724. 
75 Muhammad Mizanur Rahaman, ‘Bangladesh–from a Country of Flood to a Country of Water Scarcity–
Sustainable Perspective for Solution’, in Seminar on Environment and Development (Hamburg, Germany: 
Entwicklungsforum Bangladesh e.V., 2005), 
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 As shown in the figure above, the significant reduction of flow in the dry months due to 
the Farakka barrage has resulted in adverse environmental and socioeconomic impacts on 
Bangladesh’s ecosystem and environment. The impacts of the hydrologic alteration in the 
surrounding ecosystem can be seen in the significant change in the variation of the Ganges river 
flow from its natural range. The maintenance of the river flow variation within its natural range is 
key to ensuring social-ecological sustainability of the river basin. 76 Prior to 1975, unregulated dry 
season flows in the river were adequate to sustain the demand for water in Bangladesh.77 The dam 
was built to divert 1133m3 .s-1 of water. Since the commissioning of the barrage, the Ganges flow 
in Bangladesh, measured at the Hardinge Bridge point, actually decreased significantly during the 
dry months of January to May, when this amount of water was diverted to the Hooghly River from 
the Ganges. 78 The average pre-Farakka flow (1934-1975) was 2340 cubic meters per second, 
whereas the average post-Farakka flow was a mere 1236 cubic meters per second (1975 – 1995) 
at Hardinge Bridge during the dry season.  
Thus, the flow alteration has resulted in losses in a variety of sectors such as agriculture, 
fisheries, navigation, ecology, industry and so forth in the south-western region. 79 Fisheries were 
negatively impacted due to the salinization of “rich farming soil” which also negatively affected 
“agricultural and industrial production, changed the hydraulic character of the rivers and brought 




76 Gain and Giupponi, ‘Impact of the Farakka Dam on Thresholds of the Hydrologic Flow Regime in the Lower 
Ganges River Basin (Bangladesh)’. 
77 Rahman et al., ‘A Critical Review of the Ganges Water Sharing Arrangement’. 
78 Rahaman, ‘Bangladesh–from a Country of Flood to a Country of Water Scarcity–Sustainable Perspective for 
Solution’. 
79 Kawser and Samad, ‘Political History of Farakka Barrage and Its Effects on Environment in Bangladesh’. 
80 Rakesh Tiwary, ‘Conflicts over International Waters’, Economic and Political Weekly 41 (1 January 2006): 
1684–92, https://doi.org/10.2307/4418147. 
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via the Bay of Bengal due to the diminished flows of the Ganges during non-monsoon season. In 
March 1974, salinity at Khulna was recorded at 380 micromhos/cm but in May 1995, the salinity 
was 29500 micromhos/cm. 81This change in flow volume means the “system’s ability to flush out 
the saltwater, which damages crops, threatens delicate mangrove ecosystems, decreases the 
amount of arable land” and thus decreases the amount of freshwater available to be used in 
households, agriculture and even industry.82 The freshwater which flows from the Ganga river 
through the Gorai-Madhumati channel is instrumental in the state of the salinity in the coastal 
region of the southwest of the country.83  
The very ecological makeup of the ecosystem is dependent on the mixing of freshwater 
and salt water. Thus, when the supply of freshwater from the upstream Ganga was diverted, the 
salinity of the river downstream increased. This has led to a reduction in fish and agricultural 
diversity of the coast.84 The water diversion has also meant the destruction of “the breeding and 
raising grounds for 109 species of Gangetic fishes and other aquatic species and amphibians.”85 
Mangrove plants such as the Heritiera forms too have suffered; in the large mangrove forests of 
the Sundarbans floral composition has drastically changed.  Additionally, groundwater levels 
decreased, especially in the areas of Khulna, Jessore, Kustia and Rajshahi. Considering that  37% 
of the total area and 33% of the total population of Bangladesh depends on the Ganges basin, these 
adverse impacts are especially devastating. The decreased dry season flow of the Ganges into 
 
81 Rahaman, ‘Bangladesh–from a Country of Flood to a Country of Water Scarcity–Sustainable Perspective for 
Solution’. 
82 M. Monirul Qader Mirza and Maminul Haque Sarker, ‘Effects on Water Salinity in Bangladesh’, in The Ganges 
Water Diversion: Environmental Effects and Implications, ed. M. Monirul Qader Mirza, Water Science and 
Technology Library (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2004), 81–102, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2792-
5_5. 
83 This is one of the distributaries of the Ganga river. 
84 Gain and Giupponi, ‘Impact of the Farakka Dam on Thresholds of the Hydrologic Flow Regime in the Lower 
Ganges River Basin (Bangladesh)’. 
85 Gain and Giupponi. 
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Bangladesh also worsened the excessive river bed situation in Bangladesh, reducing the 
conveyance capacity of the river channels.  Tragically this meant a country already predisposed to 
flooding has witnessed an increased quantity of severe floods in the monsoon season.86 In 2001, 
38% of rural families depended on groundwater year round and 36% depended on groundwater 
for half the year, as compared to 100% of families depending on surface water annually before the 
barrage was built. In urban areas, almost all of the urban populace depended on groundwater for 
the whole year while in the pre-barrage years, about 30 to 50% of the families would depend on 
surface water annually. 87 This has been because of the degradation of the quality of surface water 
after the barrage was built, with patches of “stagnant water in rivers, ponds, and floodplains” 
containing large quantities of algae and suspended matter (2.00 to 5.00g/L) most of the time.88  
 Economically the barrage has affected the availability of goods and services provided by 
the ecosystem in the mangrove forests, which affects poor communities that depend upon them for 
their livelihoods. The upstream withdrawal due to the barrage has also aggravated bankline 
movement in downstream areas, causing riverbank erosion. All along the banks of the Padma river, 
which is the main distributary of the Ganga in Bangladesh, there has been no industrial 
development here due to the fear of erosion.89 In the district of Barguna, the river bank erosion 
was instrumental in causing half of the farmers to lose their land.90 The loss of the agricultural 
sector in affected areas meant many agricultural laborers and small landowners lost their main 
 
86 Ashok Swain, ‘Displacing the Conflict: Environmental Destruction in Bangladesh and Ethnic Conflict in India’, 
Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 2 (1 May 1996): 189–204, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343396033002005. 
87 M. M. Adel, ‘Effect on Water Resources from Upstream Water Diversion in the Ganges Basin’, Journal of 
Environmental Quality 30, no. 2 (April 2001): 356–68, https://doi.org/10.2134/jeq2001.302356x. 
88 Adel. 
89 Mohammad Amir Hossain Bhuiyan, S. M. Didar-Ul Islam, and Gausul Azam, ‘Exploring Impacts and Livelihood 
Vulnerability of Riverbank Erosion Hazard among Rural Household along the River Padma of Bangladesh’, 
Environmental Systems Research 6, no. 1 (21 December 2017): 25, https://doi.org/10.1186/s40068-017-0102-9. 
90 Swain, ‘Displacing the Conflict: Environmental Destruction in Bangladesh and Ethnic Conflict in India’. 
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source of income. Interestingly, there have been changes in agricultural practices in jute, sugarcane 
and rice cultivation. Land previously dedicated to jute production was now being used to grow 
sugarcane and rice due to the climatic irregularity. This had an impact on the quick turnaround of 
farmers’ incomes; sugarcane takes four to five months to grow whereas jute takes only three.91 
 Fishermen too were affected; the years in the aftermath of the barrage witnessed the virtual 
disappearance of fishing villages in the Kushtia district of the Khulna division. The economic cost 
of the infrastructure to Bangladesh is immense, according to calculations by the Bangladeshi 
segment of the India-Bangladesh Joint River Commission.92 The consolidated financial losses 
incurred by Bangladesh from 1976 to 1993 total 113, 240 million taka as shown in Figure 6. This 
amounts to almost US$ 3 billion as calculated in accordance with the 1991 price index. This 
calculation is actually on the conservative side, as the office had not been able to estimate the cost 
to Bangladesh of the greater incidences of severe floods and erosion of the river bank.93  
 
Figure 6. Economic losses due to environmental disaster aggravated with the construction of Farakka Barrage, 1976-
1993. 94 
   
 
91 Adel, ‘Effect on Water Resources from Upstream Water Diversion in the Ganges Basin’. 





Figure 7. Major consequences of reduction of the dry season flow. 95 
 
Social Stability 
Large numbers of displaced population due to actions of another riparian state 
 As previously established, the Farakka Barrage had tremendous negative impacts on the 
lives of Bangladeshi citizens, particularly those who were poor and lived in the southwest of the 
country. The crux of the problem was the environmental damage the dam caused to the common 
people in Bangladesh. The water diversion at Farakka has introduced a new ecological system and 
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disrupted fisheries and navigation and caused the salinization of rich farming soil. Thus, industrial 
and agricultural production were adversely affected. More importantly, it changed the ecosystem 
of the delta, reducing water availability in the dry season which inundated the agricultural sector 
in the south-west of Bangladesh. Furthermore, the increased salinity of the water forced several 
industries to close down in addition to reducing domestic water supply.96 The reduced dry season 
flow has also reduced the conveyance capacity of river channels, which has led to an increase in 
calamitous monsoon floods. Disappearance of land left landowners monetarily bereft, and most 
fishing villages in the district of Khulna in the east to disappear.  
The dangerous combination of high floods and riverbank erosion then displaced many 
people in Khulna. The rural economy, which was dependent on the ecosystem, was unable to 
support this internally displaced population. Bangladesh’s fragile urban economy could not absorb 
such high numbers of poor rural migrants from the area affected by the Farakka dam. The reality 
of life in the other neighboring countries appeared grim. Burma (now Myanmar) was and continues 
to be ruled by a military junta with a disaster of an economy; China a communist and deeply 
authoritarian country hostile to migrants; and even Pakistan, though a fellow Muslim majority 
country, was beleaguered by instability, terrorism and violence. These candidates were hardly 
attractive to migrants, no matter how desperate, from a country that did have a history of pluralistic 
democracy. India appeared the most attractive destination; it had relatively porous borders in its 
northeast, a functioning democracy as well as a deep-seated “linguistic, ethnic and cultural heritage 
shared by Bengalis on either side of the border.”97 Thus, the exodus across the border and into 
 
96 Arpita Bhattacharyya and Michael Werz, ‘Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict in South Asia’ (Center for 
American Progress; Heinrich Boll Siftung, December 2012), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11/ClimateMigrationSubContinentReport_small_execsumm.pdf?_ga=2.191758697.21260975
4.1617307969-1880600904.1615824760. 
97 Ben Saul, ‘The Security Risks of Climate Change Displacement in Bangladesh - ProQuest’, Journal of Human 
Security 8, no. 2 (2012): 5–35. 
38 
India began. Having left one disaster, most migrants quickly found themselves deep in another of 
a more sociopolitical nature.  
 
 
Fig 8. Path of an environmental refugee.98 
 
Most of these climate migrants travelled either to West Bengal or Assam.  Assam is a state 
in northeastern India nestled between China, Myanmar, Nepal and Bhutan. It is a melting pot of 
ethnicities, languages, and tribes. In fact, the label ‘Assamese’ can be applied to a broad spectrum 
of people; including “tribal communities, non-tribal communities of different religions, indigenous 
groups, and non-natives who share a common cultural heritage of Assam and speak the Assamese 
language.” Yet, the migration of Bangladeshis fleeing poor environmental and economic 
conditions upset the precarious political balance of the indigenous and Hindu Assamese and their 
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perceived political security. This influx of Bengali Muslim migrants arguably culminated in one 
of the state’s worst episodes of ethnic violence; such as the Nellie Massacre of 1983 where Muslim 
Bengalis were violently attacked by the native Assamese, leaving many dead.  
Ethnic Violence 
The ‘Axom Andolan’ or the Assam agitation of 1979 was led by the All-Assam Students 
Union (AASU), and the Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AGSP), which was a coalition of a few 
regional political and cultural organizations. These groups represented an anti-foreigner movement 
in the state, demanding that ‘illegal immigrants’ or migrant Bangladeshis be taken off voter lists 
due to their claim that political parties were benefiting from these large illegal electoral rolls.99 
They relied on census data and electoral rolls, which showed drastically higher rates of population 
growth and of voters in Assam compared to the rest of India. The movement’s leaders demanded 
steps be taken to “identify, disenfranchise and deport illegal aliens.” 100 After 1979, political 
turmoil reigned with high levels of “governmental instability, sustained civil disobedience 
campaigns,” and some of the bloodiest ethnic violence in the state’s history. 101 
On the 18th of February in 1983 in Nellie, a rural constituency in central Assam, the 
immediate aftermath of the state’s legislative assembly saw a large-scale act of violence against 
East Bengali migrants. Almost 2000 Muslim peasants were killed in the incident. The violence 
occurred in the wake of opposition to the Central government’s decision to hold elections with 
reforming the electoral rolls from the AASU. Unfettered by clashes between pro- and anti-election 
groups, elections were held. In areas with many native Assamese and scheduled tribes, it was 
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feasible to boycott the elections. However, Muslim Bengalis were prepared to cast their votes in 
defiance of the boycott. At around eight in the morning, a large armed mob surrounded several 
Muslim dominated villages and marched to slogans such as ‘Long Live Assam’.102 The 
perpetrators of the killings included the Assamese Hindus, the Mikir, the Boro, Lalung or the 
Tiwas, who are an indigenous group inhabiting specific tracts in the plains of Assam.103 Armed 
with machetes and country-made guns, they razed houses to the ground, and destroyed crops and 
fields.104 Unofficial estimates place around 3000 people dead, with most of them women and 
children. The next of kin of the deceased were given Rs 5000 as compensation, while survivors 
were given tin sheets to rebuild their homes105. The enquiry commission, led by an IAS officer 
named Tewary, concluded that ‘it is entirely unwarranted to give a communal colour to the 
incidents under enquiry.’ 106 
Although political normalcy was regained after 1983, the specter of climate change 
threatens to tilt the precarious balance of peace toward violence. With the Brahmaputra river 
overflowing and causing high-intensity floods displacing over 5 lakh families in Assam in June 
2020, the region continues to be environmentally unstable.107 In Bangladesh, people will face 
increasing floods, projections of sea level rise of 5.5 inches by 2030, increase in temperatures 
crippling agriculture.108 Much like the environmental disaster of the Farakka dam, international 
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migration could become a salient option for Bangladeshis who are constantly plagued with 
dwindling livelihoods and environmental threats to their lives. Should Bangladesh’s urban centers 
fail to provide social safety nets and ensure the sustainability of the city’s livelihoods, much 
migration could take place to eastern states such as West Bengal and Assam. In an economically 
underdeveloped state such as Assam, even a slight increase in external migration to the area could 
have a significant violent sociopolitical fallout. In the current political atmosphere under the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its emphasis on the National Register of Citizens could embolden 
existing anti-migrant movements. Unless mitigating economic and border security is implemented 
in both Bangladesh and India, the exodus of climate migration is destined to be haunted by the 
specter of the Nellie massacre, of which justice still eludes the victims today.  
Analysis 
The continued politicization of this Bangladesh-India migration by the ruling BJP 
government in India shows no signs of abating. It is hardly an exaggeration to state that this issue 
will remain a thorn-in-the-side in India and Bangladesh’s working relationship which raises the 
possibility of conflict. India claims it has raised the issue of illegal migration with Bangladesh 
during the meeting of the home ministers of both countries in August 2019 , but Bangladesh refutes 
this claim.109 According to media reports, it was precisely this disagreement over illegal migration 
that prevented the countries from issuing a joint declaration after the meeting. India has had little 
success with both deflecting the number of foreigners seeking to cross the border into India as well 
as gathering reliable data on the number of Bangladeshi migrants into India; the latter has made it 
hard to convince Bangladesh to engage in dialogue. Should the migration increase in volume and 
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intensity (as is predicted due to climate change), the dialogue around the question of national 
security in India could turn very ugly.  
Institutional Resilience110 
 The social instability and environmental issues faced at the border between India and 
Bangladesh is compounded by the severe lack of conflict resolution mechanisms, the lack of river 
basin organizations, the lack of monitoring, treaties that are imprecise and overly technical, as well 
as a lack of an inclusion of intergovernmental organizations. The two countries also have yet to 
coordinate an adequate framework for dealing with physical changes to the ecosystem that have 
occurred due to the infrastructure being built. 
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Statute of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission 
  After Bangladesh became independent from Pakistan, the two governments agreed 
to create an Indo-Bangladesh Joint River Commission  (JRC) to develop the waters of the Ganga 
river in March 1972 . However, it did not address the issue of water sharing. There was a joint 
declaration at the ministerial level which was to ensure the augmentation of the dry season flow of 
the Ganga. The JRC was created with the aim of allowing India and Bangladesh to cooperate “in 
harnessing the rivers common to both countries for benefit of people of the two countries” and “to 
maintain liaison between participating countries in order to ensure the most effective joint efforts 
in maximizing the benefits from the common river systems to both countries.” 112 The Commission 
was also tasked with formulating and implementing measures for controlling floods. In November 
1972, the statute of the JRC was signed; the statute stipulated that the Commission was to meet as 
often as necessary, “generally four times a year.”113 However, the Statute’s imprecise nature 
resulted in a failure to ensure India was obliged to “adapt or change the operation of the Farakka 
Barrage”. This left Bangladesh with no option but to continue complaining about the 
arrangement.114  
 It is apparent that by 1974, Bangladesh had reconciled itself to the notion that the Farakka 
Barrage was a ‘fait accompli’ during Sheikh Mujib’s third visit to India from 12th to 16th May 
1974. Bangladeshi authorities focused their concerns on the course of action of the barrage rather 
than the existence of it. A joint declaration issued on the visit stated that both countries agreed the 
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augmentation of the dry season Ganga river flows were critical to meet the water demands of India 
and Bangladesh. Two paragraphs in particular are of interest, as they afforded significant 
concessions to India.  
  “ 17. The two Prime Ministers took note of the fact that the Farakka Barrage Project 
would be commissioned before the end of 1974. They recognised that during  
the periods of minimum flow in the Ganga, there might not be enough water to meet the 
needs of the Calcutta Port and the full requirements of Bangladesh and therefore, the fair 
weather flow of the Ganga in the lean months would have to be augmented to meet the 
requirements of the two countries. It was agreed that the problems should be approached 
with understanding so that the interests of both the countries are reconciled and the 
difficulties removed in a spirit of friendship  and cooperation. It was, accordingly, decided 
that the best means of such  augmentation through optimum utilisation of the water 
resources of the region available to the two countries should be studied by the Joint Rivers 
Commission. The Commission should make suitable recommendations to meet the 
 requirements of both the countries. 
  18. It was recognised that it would take some years to give effect to the 
recommendations of the Commission as accepted by the two Governments. In the 
 meantime, the two sides expressed their determination that before the Farakka 
 Project is commissioned they would arrive at a mutually acceptable allocation of 
 the water available during the periods of minimum flow in the Ganga.” 115 
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Bangladesh did concede that the augmentation would be by the way of “optimum 
utilization of the water resources” of the Ganga river available to both countries. This inadvertently 
locked Bangladesh into a most unfavorable position as it implied an acceptance of India’s position 
on diverting the water from another shared river basin, the Brahmaputra (which will be discussed 
in detail later), to augment the Ganges’ flow. Bangladesh did suggest a variety of schemes at the 
JRC to store monsoon flows of the Ganges River in India and Nepal to supplement flows during 
the lean season months. This was countered by India who offered to transfer water from the 
Brahmaputra to the Ganges River, which was rejected by Bangladesh on the grounds of technical 
reasons.  
1975 Partial Accords 
 In April 1975, the first agreement on the Ganges River was finally reached. Known as the 
‘Partial Accord’, the agreement involved Bangladesh agreeing to the test run of the newly 
completed feeder canal of the barrage on the 18th of April 1975.116 The Accord was not signed by 
the parties as it was announced via a joint press release in Dhaka. The agreement referred to 
discussions held from the 16th to 18th of April between the Bangladeshi delegation (headed by the 
Minister of Flood Control, Water Resources and Power) and the Indian delegation (headed by the 
Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation).117 The Accord affirmed that “while discussions regarding 
allocation of fair weather flow of the Ganges during lean months in terms of the Prime Ministers 
declaration of May 1974 are continuing, it is essential to run the feeder canal of the Farakka 
Barrage during the current lean period.” The amounts diverted through the feeder canal are shown 
in the table below.  
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Fig 10. Summary of the amount of Ganges waters diverted to the Feeder Canal under the 1975 Partial Accord .118 
 The Accord did attempt to set up some mechanisms to ensure monitoring; joint teams were 
created to observe the impacts of water withdrawals in both Farakka in Bangladesh and on the 
Hooghly river in India for the Calcutta port. Another joint team stationed at Farakka was tasked 
with recording discharges into the feeder canal as well as the leftover flows for Bangladesh. This 
allowed the Farakka Barrage to come into operation. India received legitimacy for a plan that had 
taken fifteen years to come to fruition and Bangladesh gave acceptance to the barrage by sending 
a delegation to its inauguration. Indeed, the remaining flows for Bangladesh during the forty-one 
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Fig 11. Summary of the share of India and Bangladesh of the Ganges waters at Farakka under the 1975 Partial 
Accord .119 
India’s share fluctuated between 20% of the available water in the beginning ten days 
period and 24.43% in the final ten days period whereas Bangladesh received between 80% and 
75.57% of the available water in the same duration, respectively.120 Bangladesh’s share during 
these forty-one days represented about 77% of the total quantity of water for the period whilst 
India received 23% of the total amount in the same time frame.121 In retrospect, the 1975 Accord 
was not partial to Bangladesh. It allowed India rights to commission the Farakka barrage without 
concrete obligations of fixed amounts of water to be released to Bangladesh for a sensible period 
until the countries agreed on the problem of augmentation. After the test run of the feeder canal 
for six weeks of the lean or dry season and seven months during the monsoon season and the feeder 
canal operating at full capacity, it appeared unreasonable on Bangladesh’s part to demand India 
close the gates to the feeder canal. It is possible that Sheikh Mujib was optimistic about his ability 
to come to an agreement with Indira Gandhi during the monsoon season of 1975, which can be 
deduced from the ‘Partial Accord’ title of the agreement which suggests to observers that it was 
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not meant to be permanent. With the assassination of Sheikh Mujib, this possibility had 
disappeared.  
Though the agreement expired on the 31st of May 1975, India nevertheless withdrew water 
to the maximum capacity of the feeder canal, amounting to 40,000 cusecs.122 In 1976, Bangladesh 
brought this issue to the United Nations and a resolution was sponsored exhorting India to consider 
the interests of Bangladesh and therefore share a greater amount of water with it. Although the 
resolution failed to pass, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Statement of Consensus 
calling on both parties to resolve the issue in a peaceful manner.123   
1977 Ganges Waters Agreement 
 Thus, an agreement was signed under the direction of the 31st United Nations General 
Assembly between the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the Government 
of the Republic of India on November 5th 1977 at Dhaka, which would be valid for five years. The 
treaty dealt with the sharing of the Ganges River’s waters at Farakka as well as augmenting the 
flow of the river.124 The treaty came after India unilaterally withdrew water from the Ganges River 
from June 1975 to November 1977. The water was to be shared during the dry months (January to 
May) and divided into ten day periods.125 A schedule of these dry season flows at Farakka was 
drawn up based on 75% of the available flow at Farakka according to historical data records from 
1948 until 1973.126 An especially important feature of the 1977 agreement was the “guarantee 
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clause” which stipulated that in the case of particularly low flows at Farakka, Bangladesh would 
be guaranteed at least 80% of its share for the 10 day periods.127  
 The Agreement comprised fifteen articles, a schedule and a Side Letter and was tripartite. 
Part A dealt with “Arrangements for Sharing the Waters of the Gange at Farakka”, Part B with 
“Long-term Arrangements” and Part C with “Review and Duration.”128 It is important to note that 
the preamble to the agreement delineated the desire to find an equitable resolution of the problem 
of water sharing “without affecting the rights and entitlements of either country other than those 
covered by this Agreement, or establishing any general principles of law or precedent.”129 This 
cautious wording does suggest that India did not want its hands tied over any of the other rivers it 
shared with Bangladesh in any potential negotiations. In regards to excess and deficit flows, the 
agreement stipulated that if “during a particular 10-day period the Ganges flows at Farakka come 
down to such a level that the share of Bangladesh is lower than 80 percent of the value shown in 
column 4, the release of the waters to Bangladesh during that 10-day period shall not fall below 
80 percent of the value shown in column 4.” 130 The institutional sharing mechanism provided by 
the treaty was the ‘Joint Committee’, consisting of equal numbers of representatives nominated by 
both governments. The arrangement was to install teams at both Farakka in West Bengal and at 
Hardinge Bridge in Bangladesh to record the daily flows at the Hardinge Bridge, in the feeder 
canal as well as below the Farakka Barrage. The Committee was required to send the data collected 
and an annual report to both governments called the ‘Joint Committee’. The main task of the 
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Committee was ensuring the terms of the agreement was implemented, examining any difficult 
arising as a result of the said implementation as well as of the operation of the Farakka Barrage.  
 The escalation pathway of any disagreement was as follows; if the Committee could not 
resolve a dispute or disagreement, it would be referred to a panel with the same number of experts. 
Should this second option fail to produce consensus, the matter would be referred to the two 
governments. The two states would urgently meet and conduct a mutual discussion. If even this 
method failed, the two governments could make other mutually agreed upon arrangements as they 
saw fit. This typically meant parties opting for political means of resolution, rather than legal. The 
stipulations under Part B for long-term arrangements laid down the terms of dealing with the issue 
of low flow in the Ganges River during lean season. Article IX of the agreement bestowed the 
responsibility of investigating and studying schemes of augmenting the dry season flows to the 
Joint Rivers Commission (JRC), that was established in 1972.131 Any dispute or difference of 
opinion related to this section of the Agreement would also be referred to both governments for a 
solution. The dispute mechanism here was slightly different than in Part A although both parties 
chose the political route to resolve disagreements for both parts of the Agreement.  
 The Side Letter referred to Article IX of the Agreement on programs for augmenting the 
flows of the Ganges River proposed or to be proposed by either the Bangladeshi or Indian 
government. According to the Letter, the governments had reached an understanding that the 
schemes proposed “do not exclude any scheme or schemes for building storages in the upper 
reaches of the Ganges in Nepal.”132 This is highly unusual under international water law as 
contracting parties do not reserve the right to ascribe obligations to a third party without their 
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consent.133 The Joint Rivers Commission meanwhile continued to yield no meaningful agreement 
between the countries on the issue of augmentation of the lean season flow of the Ganges. The 
Commission requested the two countries to submit their proposals by mid-March 1978, but 
meetings persisted without any consensus throughout 1979 and 1980. India proposed constructing 
a barrage across the Brahmaputra River in Assam with a link canal 200 miles in length from the 
barrage to the Ganges River at a point north of Farakka. The link canal would fall two-thirds in 
India and one-third in Bangladesh. Furthermore, India desired construction of two storage dams 
on the Brahmaputra River.  
 Bangladesh on the other hand, proposed constructing storage reservoirs of the Ganges 
River in India and Nepal. In addition to serving the purpose of augmenting dry season flows, these 
reservoirs could provide a source of hydropower as well as the groundwater from the area 
providing additional sources of water. Bangladesh rejected the proposal of diverting water from 
the Brahmaputra to augment the Ganges because it argued the dry season flow of the Brahmaputra 
was not sufficient to meet all the needs of the basin itself let alone to sustain another one. The 
adverse environmental effects of such a decision was also not lost on Bangladesh such as water 
logging and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. Bangladesh was also deeply 
concerned with the potential parallels of the barrage and link channel on India’s control over the 
Brahmaputra with India’s existing control over the Farakka Barrage. India also refused 
Bangladesh’s proposal on the grounds that “the storage reservoirs on the upper reaches of the 
Ganges could not store enough water to solve the problem of the low flow of the Ganges” during 
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the lean season.134 Thus, the JRC did not resolve the issue of augmentation and the matter was 
relegated to the political route at a high governmental level. 
Memorandum of Understanding 1982-1983 
 After the expiration of the 1977 Agreement in 1982, both countries signed two 
‘Memoranda of Understanding’ (MoU) between 1983 and 1988 which made minor adjustments to 
the 1977 agreement.135 The total amount of water to be shared between both riparian states 
remained the same with the removal of the guarantee clause. This meant that between 1989 and 
1996, there was no mechanism for sharing the waters of the Ganges River. The 1982 MoU stated 
that excess or deficit flow would be shared according to the available supply at the time; if the 
flow was especially low, both governments were to immediately consult each other and make a 
decision on how to avoid placing undue burden on either country. This agreement was completely 
different from the 1977 agreement whereby Bangladesh was guaranteed its share would not be less 
than 80% of the amount it was intended to receive. The deletion of the guarantee clause would be 
felt by Bangladesh in the dry season of 1983. On April 5th 1983, the Ganges at Farakka saw a 
historic low flow of 39,000 cusecs as compared to an expected 59,000 cusecs. Out of the scheduled 
share on this day of 35,000 cusecs, Bangladesh only received 24,425 cusecs. An agreement was 
reached on July 20th 1983 which provided for two situations. Firstly, if the flow at Farakka was 
equal to or greater than 75% of the standard flow for the corresponding ten day period, Bangladesh 
would receive the intended proportion. If the flow was below this 75% threshold, the agreement 
stated that Bangladesh would receive a release according to the calculations : a) the pro-rata release 
for Bangladesh at 75% of standard flow is calculated; b) the pro-rate release for Bangladesh is 
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calculated at the actual flow; c) (a) – (b) is the burden; d) the burden is shared between the two 
countries on a 50-50 basis, such that 50% of (c) would be added to (b). 136 Although this was 
definitely not as favorable as the guarantee clause under which Bangladesh’s share was not less 
than 80% , it was perhaps the best possible deal under the circumstances. 
 The 1985 MoU called for studies by a joint committee of experts (JCE) on long term 
schemes for augmentation of the Ganges flows at Farakka within a period of twelve months. 
Though the JCE did hear proposals by both sides for twenty-four months, they did not achieve a 
resolution of the issue. The sharing agreements under this MoU expired on the 31st of May 1985, 
after which India reduced the flow of water to Bangladesh due to the absence of an agreement 
between the two riparian nations. Talks held between June 1990 and August 1991 could not 
breakthrough the impasse; even meetings between the two prime ministers in May 1992, April 
1993 and May 1995 and talks between the foreign secretaries failed to made headway.137 
Ganges Water Sharing treaty 1996 
 Finally, on 12th December 1996, the governments of India and Bangladesh signed the most 
recent treaty on water sharing of the Ganges River at Farakka during the dry months of January 
till May which lasts until 2026. The flow at Farakka during the dry season months would be shared 
between the two riparian states based on a unique formula, divided into fifteen ten day periods. An 
indicative schedule was set up by the treaty, based on calculations of the total average historic 
flows at Farakka from the year 1949 until 1988 which would determine each country’s share of 
water. One of the most important features of the treaty is the stipulation that each country is assured 
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of 35,000 cusecs of flow in alternating ten day periods during the most “critical periods between 
March 11 and May 10.” 138  
 
Fig 12. Share of India and Bangladesh of the Waters of the Ganges at Farakka under the 1996 Treaty.139  
 The Treaty maintained the two parameters formerly established by previous agreements 
and in the 1975 Partial Accord; first, that the “quantum of water to be released by India to 
Bangladesh would be at Farakka” and second that “the share of each country would be in 10-day 
periods (with 11-day periods in the case of 31-day months) from January 1 to May 31.”140 
Nevertheless, there were some noteworthy differences. As maintained by both the 1977 Agreement 
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and the 1996 Treaty, the proportion of water sharing between India and Bangladesh from the period 
of January 1st to May 31st is approximately 40:60 and 48:52 respectively.141 Under the 1996 Treaty, 
Bangladesh’s share reduced by about 8% as compared to provisions under the 1977 Agreement. 
For three crucial lean season months (March 1st to May 31st), Bangladesh’s water share decreased 
from roughly 61% under the 1977 Agreement to around 50% under the 1996 Treaty. 142 
 The allocation of water to Bangladesh in the 1996 Treaty was found to be in the region of 
50% less than pre-Barrage average flow at the Hardinge Bridge in Bangladesh, meaning the treaty 
is not likely to solve the water shortage in non-monsoon months in the southwestern region of 
Bangladesh. The third and fourth columns of the Schedule to the 1977 Agreement, the two 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs) signed, were titled “Withdrawal by India at Farakka” and 
“Release to Bangladesh” respectively. Even though Article I of the Treaty designates the point of 
release of water by India to Bangladesh is at Farakka, the third and fourth columns of the Annexure 
1 to the Treaty are simply titled “India’s share” and “Bangladesh’s share”, which implies India’s 
acceptance that Bangladesh is receiving its share and not solely what is India is releasing to it.143 
An equally notable difference is unlike Article II of the 1977 Agreement, the 1996 Treaty does not 
guarantee a minimum amount of flow for Bangladesh, should the flow at Farakka reduce 
dramatically.  
Article II (ii) states that every “effort would be made by the upper riparian to protect flows 
of water at Farakka as in the 40-years average availability as mentioned above.”144 The treaty 
neither defines nor elaborates on what is meant by ‘every effort’, meaning in the case of reduced 
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flows at Farakka India is under no obligation to protect the flow to Bangladesh. It is also interesting 
that the Article used the phrase “upper riparian” as this terminology of ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ is not 
used anywhere else in the Treaty. Due to the signatories being India and Bangladesh, it is fair to 
assume that ‘upper riparian’ would mean India.145 It must be noted that the Ganges River does 
flow through several states in India, namely Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Haryana, 
Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Delhi and of course West Bengal before reaching Bangladesh. These 
states are densely populated and have huge demands for water for irrigation, household use and 
industry, which presents a huge challenge to keeping the Ganges flow to the 40 years average 
availability level as delineated in the Schedule to the Treaty. This also means that water sharing 
according to the Annexure I, Article II, leaves Bangladesh dependent on the will of the upstream 
users at Farakka.146 Besides that, there exists no water sharing arrangement if the flow at Farakka 
falls below 50,000 cusecs in any ten day period specified by the Treaty according to Article II (iii). 
Though India and Bangladesh are supposed to immediately discuss a just method to share the 
water, there is no stipulated time frame for this meeting. Thus, as the Treaty lacks a minimum 
guarantee clause, the indicative schedule of Annexure II of the 1996 Treaty does not indicate the 
“entitlement in terms of absolute volume of water for each country on a day-to-day basis.”147  
The Treaty also does not include precise dispute resolution mechanisms. There is a Joint 
Committee (JC) set up resembling the one previously established in the 1977 Agreement and the 
two MoUs of 1982 and 1985. The JC consists of an equal number of representatives nominated by 
the Indian and Bangladeshi authorities respectively and is tasked with implementing the sharing 
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agreements in line with the Treaty’s provisions. For dispute settlement, if the Joint Committee 
cannot solve the dispute by itself the Joint River Commission is called in.148 Should this 
Commission not be able to resolve the issue, the matter will be referred to the government level. 
The Treaty the  level of government is not specified under the Treaty nor the time frame for this 
form of dispute settlement. Most importantly, the Treaty does not hold any party to resolving the 
dispute if the disagreement perseveres.149 It is apparent that dispute settlement provisions , such as 
the provisions under the previous agreements, are rooted in political resolution routes. No 
consideration is given to the roles of third party intervention such as in “fact finding, mediation or 
arbitration.”150 There also appears no consideration of expanding the approach to the Ganges from 
a bilateral to multilateral one from India’s perspective as evinced in the proposals for 
augmentation. The Treaty also incorporates several vague provisions, as well as provisions that 
are logistically difficult to implement or simply “agreements to agree.” An example of these 
provisions that are hard to implement would be a paragraph in Annexure I, stating that “India and 
Bangladesh shall each receive guaranteed 35,000 cusecs of water in alternate three 10-day periods 
during the period March 1 to May 10”.151  
Similarly vague commitments are exemplified in the case of provisions of flood control 
measures. The preamble to the Treaty does mention flood management as an area for cooperation 
though there are no stipulations for flood control included in the main body of the Treaty. Since 
the Treaty, as the previous agreements did, operates only in the five dry months of the year, it has 
no say over the remaining monsoon months. Unfortunately, Bangladesh was affected by one of 
the worst floods in 1998 with floods raging from the middle of July through late September, with 
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the Ganges River levels rising to the highest level in a hundred years. At least 860,000 hectares of 
agricultural lands and more than 50% of Dhaka were submerged with over 40 million people 
affected by these floods.152 Even India saw the most destructive annual monsoon season to date in 
West Bengal. This revealed the scope of the Treaty to be broadened to encompass regional level 
discussions with Nepal and China , which were also riparian states to the Ganges River. No effort 
was made to address environmental degradation around the Ganges Basin either.  
Furthermore, there is a difference in the basis for calculating the Ganges flows to Farakka 
during the dry season. In Annexure II of the 1996 Treaty, the flow at Farakka was calculated on 
the basis of the average flows for the 1949 to 1988 period. In the 1977 Agreement, the indicative 
flows are estimated based on the 75% availability of the historical ten day average flows for the 
twenty five years between 1948 and 1973.153 The result was that the average total Ganges flow 
under the Treaty for each ten day cycle exceeded the average flow under previous agreements for 
the same specified period by a margin of nearly 10%.154 Essentially, the Treaty presumed more 
water would be available than previous agreements.  
As it turned out, a few months post-conclusion of the Treaty, actual water availability at 
the Ganges revealed itself to be much lower than the average flow of the Ganges for the 1949-
1988 period (as was reiterated in the indicative schedule under the Treaty. During the last ten days 
of February 1997, the flow was supposed to favor Bangladesh but instead Bangladesh stated it 
received only 24,559 cusecs instead of the 39,106 cusecs as provided for in the Treaty. The 
situation deteriorated in late March and on March 27, the Ganges flow in Bangladesh was recorded 
as 6,500 cusecs; a historic low. Water availability in early May was only around 40,000 cusecs, 
 
152 Uprety and M.A. Salman. 
153 Rahman et al., ‘A Critical Review of the Ganges Water Sharing Arrangement’. 
154 Kazi Saidur Rahman et al., ‘A Critical Review of the Ganges Water Sharing Arrangement’, Water Policy 21, no. 
2 (27 February 2019): 259–76, https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2019.164. 
60 
much less than the 67,351 cusecs specified under the Treaty.155 Due to the Ganges flow continuing 
to be under 50,000 cusecs and the 1996 Treaty not including a guarantee clause like that of the 
1977 Agreement or burden sharing agreements such as the 1982 and 1985 MoUs, Bangladesh was 
forced to call for immediate consultation on an emergency basis as was stipulated under the Article 
II (iii) of the Treaty. Bangladesh demanded India receive the 35,000 cusecs which it was 
guaranteed under Annexure I of the Treaty and wanted a response from India on what steps India 
was taking to ensure the flow of water at Farakka was protected, under Article II (ii) of the 
Treaty.156 India did confirm the lesser flow at Farakka but merely attributed this to the normal 
hydrological cycle which occurred every four or five years and stated that it fulfilled its obligations 
under the Treaty by meeting for immediate consultation. In summary, these meetings did not 
change any of the shares of both countries or even result in any concrete solutions to the problem. 
Hence, the ad hoc method of consultation without solid dispute settlement mechanisms inclusive 
of third parties proved to be unfavorable to the downstream riparian, Bangladesh.  
Tenor of overall relations between nations 
Lack of trust 
As always, any form of negotiation is made much easier when relations between the two 
or more parties are cordial. The lesson garnered from close examination of the correlation of 
friendly political relations between India and Bangladesh and progress over Ganges water sharing 
and augmentation is two-fold; friendly relations in politics matters, and so does domestic political 
pressure.  
The first phase entailed the relation between friendly regimes and productive talks. The 
very first President of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman, had extremely close relations with 
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India and acknowledged India’s pivotal role in the liberation of Bangladesh.157 A Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Peace was signed in March 1972 which anticipated joint studies and 
a plan of action for “flood control, river basin development and the development of hydro-power 
and irrigation.158 The first series of talks took place in Delhi with Sardar Swaran Singh, Indian 
Minister of External Affairs, and his Bangladeshi counterpart, Knodakar Moshtaque Ahmed on 8th 
July 1973 to reaffirm that a final decision regarding the water sharing of the Ganges would be 
discussed at a summit meeting between the two Prime Ministers in 1974. Thus, it is clear that if 
the ruling parties have cordial relations, a mutual understanding shapes the tone of discussions, 
even regarding matters as contentious as the Ganges. Cracks soon began to reveal themselves in 
the cosy relations as domestic pressures from the opposition in Bangladesh as well as from Sheikh 
Rahman’s critics. Maulana Bhasani, who was the leader of the Awami Party, opposed the 
Friendship Treaty and publicly condemned Mujib Rahman for handing over Bangladeshi 
economic and political sovereignty to India. The issue of the Farakka Barrage merely added fire 
to fuel. After Sheikh Mujib introduced the one-party rule, he was further seen as incompetent 
having let India get away with withholding Bangladesh’s fair share of the Ganges River as well as 
causing a slide into authoritarianism. This led to a coup d’etat which was head by a number of 
frustrated army officers who established a military regime under General Ziaur Rahman.159  
The relationship between Bangladesh and India under the Ziaur Rahman administration 
was characterized by mutual suspicion and distrust. However, in 1975 and 1976 the issue of the 
Farakka Barrage was overshadowed by coups and counter-coups in Bangladesh. It was only in 
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early 1976 that Bangladesh publicly protested against India’s withdrawals from the Ganges even 
after the expiry of the 1975 Partial Accord. India attributed blame to Bangladesh in regards to the 
latter’s non-cooperation in data collection and information needed to finalize the joint assessment 
under the terms of the Accord. On its end, Bangladesh blamed India for breaching the agreement 
with its continued withdrawal even after the lapse of the forty day period of validity specified by 
the Accord. India was led by the Congress Party of Indira Gandhi, who had enjoyed a friendly 
partnership with the earlier Prime Minister Mujib Rahman. She did not make an effort to forge 
even a working relationship with her Bangladeshi counterpart. General Ziaur Rahman meanwhile 
was busy consolidating his rule with victories in the 1978 Presidential and 1979 parliamentary 
elections with support from the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Muslim League constituency. He pursued 
a largely anti-India foreign policy as members of the Jatiyo Rakhi Bahini, a paramilitary force 
formed by the Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman government, waged a guerrilla war against his regime 
after Mujib was assassinated.160 The General was therefore pro-Pakistan and pro-US in his outlook. 
In terms of water, his government held India responsible for domestic Ganges-related 
problems and also looked for support internationally on this issue. In a 1976 White Paper by 
Bangladesh, it was argued that India’s withdrawal of water adversely impacted the survival of 
millions of Bangladeshi citizens and the Bangladeshi media cast the issue as a conspiracy against 
the sovereignty of the country. In the view of Bangladesh and certainly of the Zia administration, 
Farakka was responsible for the rampant problems in the north of the country such as the floods. 
Though Bangladesh tried many international fora including the Colombo Summit of the Non-
Aligned Movement, the Islamic Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Istanbul and even the United 




Nations and the President of the United Nations General Assembly suggested a bilateral 
agreement, which Bangladesh was not partial to.  
With the election of Morarji Desai’s non-Congress government in 1977, the deadlock was 
able to be broken. Bangladesh even scaled down its water-related demands and on the 30th of 
September 1977, both countries agreed on a detailed five year agreement on Farakka which was 
formally signed two months later at Dhaka. As was discussed earlier, in 1978 both countries 
exchanged their proposals on augmentation of the Ganges flow during dry months. Technically 
the positions were not that different from the positions of the Mujib and Gandhi governments when 
negotiating the water sharing arrangement at Farakka. However, it must be noted that Congress 
emphasized its commitment to scrapping the Agreement should it come to power and was 
especially opposed to the guarantee clause, a critical component of the 1977 Agreement.  
This cordial dialogue soon soured as Congress was elected in 1980 though Indira Gandhi 
never went through with her threat of doing away with the Farakka treaty. After the five year 
period, though both governments agreed the water sharing agreement for the dry season had 
worked they could not settle the augmentation issue. Just before the matter of augmenting the 
Ganges flow in lean months was supposed to be discussed through higher political means, 
Bangladesh underwent a government change via coup d’etat which saw General Ershad coming 
to power. President Ershad signed an interim agreement for eighteen months covering the lean 
seasons of 1983 and 1984, which were each the memorandum of understanding (MoU) as was 
earlier discussed. General Ershad was domestically pressurized due to the lack of political 
legitimacy of his regime in the eyes of the Bangladeshi people. In India, Rajiv Gandhi took his 
mother, Indira Gandhi’s, place as Prime Minister and cooperated with Ershad to sign a MoU in 
1985, which was similar to the earlier 1982 MoU. Relations were complicated by the devastating 
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effects of the 1988 floods in Bangladesh which were seen across the political spectrum in 
Bangladesh as being the fault of the Farakka Barrage. Ershad made a speech stating that mitigation 
of the floods could have occurred had India shown both “concern and commitment”.161 The 
Chairman of the Bangladeshi National Party (BNP), Begum Khaleda Zia, opined that the building 
of different barrages upstream by India, including that at Farakka, was responsible for the terrible 
flooding. President Ershad and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi were actually scheduled to meet in 
1989 to sign a treaty on water sharing when in 1991 an election was held, bringing Begum Khaleda 
Zia to office. Thus, the constitution of Bangladesh was changed and the presidential system was 
changed into a parliamentary government which made Khaleda Zia the Prime Minister of 
Bangladesh.162 Here it must be noted that the issue of Farakka remains a political football in 
Bangladeshi politics. Any concession on the matter is deemed ‘selling out’ by the opposition 
parties, who clamor for a hard-line approach and making it impossible to arrive at a “bipartisan 
consensus to negotiate any mutually acceptable agreement with New Delhi.”163 Paradoxically, 
when they themselves assume the mantle of power, they find that without compromise in bilateral 
relations with India, breaking the diplomatic deadlock on the Ganges related negotiations was 
simply not possible. In this light, the BNP took a twin-track strategy regarding Farakka. It first 
explored the route of bilateral negotiations with India to reach a mutually beneficial settlement and 
secondly, it continued to seek resolution on the water sharing issue via international fora. The first 
route did not have much positive impact as there were some technical issues stemming from the 
lack of sufficiently available water to meet the needs of both countries. The second route of 
 
161 Shaukat Hassan, ‘Environmental Issues and Security in South Asia’, The Adelphi Papers 31, no. 262 (1 
September 1991): 3–6, https://doi.org/10.1080/05679329108449050. 
162 Pandey, ‘Revisiting the Politics of the Ganga Water Dispute’. 
163 Pandey. 
65 
internationalizing the issue did not endear Bangladesh to India and the atmosphere between both 
countries did not even allow for an MoU to be signed.  
Fortunately, both new countries witnessed a government change in 1996. Negotiations 
between New Delhi and Dhaka would now be headed by Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League and a 
non-Congress party coalition led by Deve Gowda.164 Both parties were motivated by a strong sense 
of urgency to reach a deal before the next dry season was upon them. The Awami League, unlike 
the BNP, was demonstrably more willing to work towards a treaty with India. This thawing in 
relations led to a visit to India by the Bangladeshi Foreign Secretary during August 1996 to lay the 
groundwork for the 1996 Treaty.  In September 1996, the Indian External Affairs Minister visited 
Bangladesh and the two countries convened a Joint Committee comprising members of both 
foreign ministries who were responsible for convening water experts from India and Bangladesh 
to work on finalizing an agreement. By bringing together political administration with the 
scientific expertise, it was easier to create flexibility and made sure engineering technicalities 
served political purpose. The Chief Minister of West Bengal at the time, Jyoti Basu, was crucial 
in narrowing differences in the two sides as he held discussions with both the Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister of Bangladesh. In the final round of negotiations, from the 5th to the 10th of 
December in New Delhi at the foreign secretaries’ level, it was decided that the agreement should 
take the form of a treaty with the duration of 30 years. Finally, the Ganges water sharing Treaty 
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Balance of Power 
The cosy relations between the Awami League and India’s Congress government will 
certainly not be replicated under a Modi or Hindutva-centric Indian government. Nonetheless, I 
posit that there will largely a continuum of both countries’ concerns. Bangladesh will always worry 
about India’s status as a hydrohegemon due to India’s position as upper riparian. Even in terms of 
geography, this is an entirely valid concern to have. Bangladesh does share more than 90% of its 
external borders with India and is encircled by the north-eastern Indian states such as West Bengal, 
Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. This has created a political state of anxiety in 
Bangladesh that their political fate is dependent on India’s will. This state of anxiety has not been 
eased by the clear dominance India has typically enjoyed in bilateral trade, the claims that 
Bangladesh is sheltering separatist groups from India’s northeast as well as a lack of progress on 
the matter of transboundary water sharing issues with Bangladesh.  
Ever since the Farakka Barrage was commissioned in 1975, India has consistently enjoyed 
the upper hand in negotiations over the Ganges River. With India possessing 79% of its 
segmentation, it does have an advantageous geographic position over the smaller and lower 
riparian state of Bangladesh.166 India has also gained geographical, material and ideological power 
through the barrage which has increased its bargaining power over Bangladesh. Therefore, India 
has the capability of setting the agenda and influencing the terms of negotiations and agreements 
which the weaker country has no other option than acquiescing. The Ganges Water diversion 
system ideally should be managed through the collaboration of all riparian states to the Ganges 
basin, including Nepal, India, China and Bangladesh. This type of resource management would 
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decrease water diversion conflicts over the Ganges flow. However, there exist no mechanisms in 
any treaty signed by India that incorporate the role of two riparian states such as Nepal and China 
due to India being unwilling. Even the Ganges Water Treaty of 1996 does not mean equitable 
cooperation; the arrangement actually appears to favor India’s interests. Bangladesh is a “deltaic 
floodplain”, which leaves it vulnerable to flooding. Under the terms of the Treaty, should river 
flow reach 2 million cusecs at Farakka, the river would breach its banks but India would not be 
allowed to withdraw more water to alleviate the floods. The Treaty has also not solved any of 
Bangladesh’s issues with water and food security. 167 India meanwhile, particularly under the BJP 
government, is focused on ensuring its security at the Bangladesh border. India is deeply concerned 
with the issue of north-eastern insurgents taking shelter in Bangladesh as well as the large scale 
illegal migration into India from Bangladesh, which is still denied by the latter. The decision India 
has undertaken to build a fence along the Indo-Bangladesh border has generated significant 
resentment in Bangladesh  which will continue to remain a sore point in transboundary water 
discussions for the Modi government.  
However, there seems to be hope for Bangladesh yet as the threat of China’s influence in 
South Asia could push India into being more willing to hear Bangladesh’s concerns on the former’s 
own terms. Although Modi’s recent visit to Dhaka in March 2021 has ended in violent protests, at 
the administrative level it appears Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is extending the olive branch to 
cooperate with the Indian government on key issues.168 This bodes well for Bangladesh’s plan to 
build a dam on the Ganges River to help mitigate the water shortages in the south-west region of 
the country, which previously did not receive approval from the Indian government. The Awami 
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League government had begun work on the project in the 1990 and has already completed a 
feasibility study and design on the proposed dam, which would be constructed at Pangsha in the 
district of Rajbari. The dam is to be situated 100 km downstream from the Farakka Barrage in 
West Bengal.  Support from India is crucial in the construction of the dam, which will aid 
Bangladesh in mitigating the rising water salinity due to sea level rise from global warming and 





Figure 13. Map of the boundary of the Ganges–Brahmaputra–Meghna (GBM) basin (thick red line), the three outlets 
(red star): Hardinge Bridge, Bahadurabad and Bhairab Bazar for the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna river basins, 
respectively. Green stars indicate the locations of three additional upstream  stations: Farakka, Pandu and Teesta. 
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Fig 14. Map of the Brahmaputra Basin.171 
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 The Brahmaputra is a large, snow-fed trans-Himalayan river which springs to life in 
southern Tibet, now ruled by China. It runs for 2880 km and the river system drains parts of 
Bhutan, India, China and Bangladesh. The Brahmaputra’s course through India and Bangladesh 
has a number of distributary channels with the main tributaries being the Kyi and Chu in Tibet, the 
Dihang, Lohit, Subansiri, Burhi Dihing, Kopili, Jia Bhareli, Manas and Gangadhar in India; and 
finally, the Teesta in Bangladesh. The Brahmaputra river basin is bounded by the Kailash and 
Nyen-Chen-Tanghla mountain ranges on the north, by the Salween River basin and the Patkai 
range along the Indo-Myanmar border on the east, by the Nepali Himalayas, the Naga and Barail 
ranges in addition to the Meghalaya Plateau in the south and also by the Ganges river basin in the 
west.172 The Brahmaputra river is 2880 km in length; 1625 km fall in China (through Tibet), 918 
km in India (via Arunachal Pradesh and Assam) and the remaining 337 km in Bangladesh. The 
Brahmaputra is known as Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet, then as the Brahmaputra in India before 
flowing southwest as the Jamuna into Bangladesh. The river then joins the Padma River (as the 
Ganges River is known in Bangladesh), before merging with the Meghna River near Chandpur. 
Then, it empties into the Bay of Bengal as the Meghna River.  
 The Teesta in particular originates at the top of the southern slopes of the Himalayas in 
Sikkim, from the waters of the Khangse and Zemu glaciers that feed the Tso Lhamo lake in a 
plateau to the northeast of the Kachenjunga.173 Along its course, the Teesta gathers streams as well 
as its major tributary, the Rangeet, at the confluence in Darjeeling’s Teesta Bazaar before crossing 
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an international border in Mekhligunj in the Cooch Behar district of Bengal. Upon crossing it 
enters Bangladesh, joins with the Brahmaputra or Jamuna river before flowing into the Bay of 
Bengal. The total length of the Teesta river is around 414 km, 150- odd of which are in Sikkim, 
with 123 km in West Bengal and the remainder of 140 km in Bangladesh. In fact, before a deluge 
in Rangpur in 1787 which broke river banks and altered the river’s course, the Teesta river was 
the primary river of the northern part of what is modern-day Bangladesh.  
 Even in the present day, the Teesta River holds great significance; it is Bangladesh’s fourth 
largest transboundary river used for “irrigation and fishing activities.”174 The floodplain of the 
Teesta spans an area of 2750 km2 in Bangladesh. The Teesta’s catchment area is split with 83% 
belonging to India and the remaining 17% to Bangladesh. The Teesta’s catchment area supports 
8.5% of the Bangladeshi population, around 10 million people, and 14% of the production of 
crops.175 
Analysis of factors causing contention 
India-Bangladesh 
Teesta 
Lack of Institutional Resilience 
 The issue of water sharing regarding the Teesta River was raised in several meetings of the 
previously discussed Joint Rivers Commission but no action was taken due to lack of scientific 
data until the twenty-fifth meeting of the Commission on 20th July 1983. In this meeting, whilst 
awaiting the completion of scientific studies on the Teesta, an ad hoc arrangement was agreed 
upon. India was to receive 39% of the flow of the river, Bangladesh would receive 36% with the 





never took the form of a “signed instrument” but it was incorporated into the minutes of the 
Commission.176 Most significantly, nowhere in the accord did it stipulate where the allocation was 
to take place, no sharing institutional mechanism, such as a committee from both sides, was created 
to take responsibility for implementing these arrangements.  
 No further discussions on the Teesta were made until the Ministerial level review of the 
Joint Committee of Experts took place on the 27th of August 1986 where Bangladesh pressed the 
issue of water sharing of the Teesta since the ad hoc arrangements in 1983 had expired. The Joint 
Committee was not able to reach a decision on either the issue of augmentation schemes of the 
Ganges nor the long-term sharing agreements on both the Teesta and the Ganges. Unfortunately, 
no more meetings of the Committee took place since the duration of the mandate was only a year, 
which had since ended. The Joint Rivers Commission was the institution that agreed that in light 
of pending scientific studies on sharing the Teesta river, the ad hoc sharing agreements for the 
Teesta river as was agreed upon in the twenty-fifth meeting of the Commission would be extended 
until the year end of 1987. 177 The failure of both the Joint Committee of Experts on the agreement 
of the joint studies in conjunction with the inability of the Joint Rivers Commission to undertake 
the necessary studies to gather data on sharing the Teesta left no other option but to proceed with 
an interim agreement. With such a deadlock over the Ganges, any agreement on any other shared 
river such as the Teesta was not to be expected. With the end of 1987, so did the interim agreement 
on the Teesta sharing too end. 178 
 Progress was made during the convening of the Joint Rivers Commission, which previously 
had stopped meeting regularly, in its 32nd meeting in Dhaka during July 19th and 20th in 1997. This 
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was the first meeting that the Commission had had in more than seven years since the last meeting 
in June 1990. In addition to agreeing to monitor and observe the implementation of the 1996 
Ganges Treaty, the Commission also agreed to discuss arrangements on the water sharing of the 
Teesta river.179 Although a series of meetings took place between 1997 and 2004, there was scant 
progress on the issue. In 2004, a Joint Technical Group was formed to discuss terms of reference 
for a coordinated assessment of the river as well as an interim arrangement on how the lean season 
flows were to be shared between India and Bangladesh. This too failed to yield results as in 2005 
the Technical Group recorded the absence of a resolution to the Teesta issue. 2005 also saw the 
disappointing conclusion by the Joint River Commission at its 36th meeting that “the lean season 
flows in [the] Teesta will not meet the needs of both the countries and hence any sharing formula 
for the lean season flows should be based on shared sacrifices.” 180 In 2010, the prime ministers of 
both countries issued a joint communiqué which called for the issue of water sharing of the river 
to be resolved as soon as possible. A draft of an agreement was drawn up as well as a statement of 
principles of sharing the Teesta waters during dry season months. Both these documents were the 
groundwork for an interim agreement on the Teesta between Bangladesh and India.181  
 Once again, negotiations over the potential Teesta agreement took place in September 2011 
when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Dhaka. In spite of this promising overture, 
the talks fell through as West Bengal’s Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee objected to the proposed 
allocation of half of the Teesta’s water to Bangladesh. The fact that water is under the jurisdiction 
of states within India’s constitution meant that the Indian government could not proceed without 
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the consent of the West Bengal government. The Indian and Bangladeshi governments did manage 
to sign a bilateral agreement which emphasized, with a rather radical departure from the status 
quo, common basin management of shared rivers. Nonetheless, the failure of India to sign the 2011 
Teesta agreement has left a bitter tone in the relations between India and Bangladesh and has 
stalled discussions on other matters such as the sharing of other transboundary rivers, namely the 
Feni, Manu, Muhuri, Khowai, Gumti, Dharla and Dudhkumar.182  
 Recent bilateral discussions over the Teesta have remained troublesome despite a number 
of meetings of the Joint River Commission, the Joint Technical Group and the Joint Committee of 
Experts on important concerns such as dry season flow. This is no doubt due to the complexities 
of the political ecology of the Teesta. Discussions have retained a strong technical flavor, with the 
social and environmental concerns by stakeholders such as local residents being largely ignored. 
In a similar vein, there has not been much space in the discussions around the Teesta for civil 
society or public participation to be heard. This has clearly resulted in indignation even at the 
national level, as evinced by the Chief Minister of West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee’s refusal to 
endorsed the 2011 agreement as she felt her state’s government was not consulted in a suitable 
manner.  There has been some movement in bilateral negotiations towards recognition of the role 
such stakeholders should play, as witnessed in May 2012 when External Affairs Minister S.M. 
Krishna stated that India was laying the groundwork for “political consensus in India” on the 
Teesta river and working with the state government of West Bengal. 183 This sentiment was echoed 
in March 2013 when the Indian President Pranab Mukherjee reassured Bangladesh of India’s 
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commitment to “a fair, reasonable solution” to the Teesta affair and that India was doing its best 
to conclude consultations with Indian stakeholders in a timely manner.184  
 Whether these words remain sentiments or whether they will bear fruit remains unclear at 
present. India’s foreign secretary, Harsh Vardhan, did express to reporters that Modi had discussed 
the Teesta during the prime minister’s visit to Dhaka recently.185 The foreign secretary stressed 
Modi’s commitment to include the “relevant stakeholders” and cooperation between the two 
countries. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina meanwhile placed emphasis on the importance of 
alleviating the suffering of millions of people who depend on the Teesta river for their livelihood, 
therefore making the matter of Bangladesh receiving its fair share of the river crucial.  
 
Contentious State of Infrastructure 
 The Teesta Barrage, much like the Farakka Barrage, is troubling for Bangladesh. The 
Teesta Barrage Project (TBP) is one of the largest irrigation schemes in the eastern region of India 
and intends to irrigate 922,000 hectares in six districts of north Bengal and provide 67.50 
megawatts upon completion. The project has three phases and aims to harness the water of the 
Teesta for irrigation, generating hydropower, navigation and controlling floods via a network of 
canals and barrages on the Teesta. Although work on the project began in 1976, only some stages 
have been completed. The completed projects include the Teesta Barrage Project (TBP) in the 
Jalpaiguri District of West Bengal and the barrages on the Mahananda and Dauk rivers. Besides 
the TBP, the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Limited is in the midst of developing the 
Teesta Low Dam III Power Station  (132 megawatts) and the Teesta Low Dam IV (160 
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megawatts). The former is a “run of the river scheme” to harness the hydropower potential of the 
Teesta, and the latter is a “run of the river scheme” possessing diurnal storage. 186 187  
 Lower downstream at the Doani-Dalia point in the Lalmonirhat district of Bangladesh lies 
the Dalia Barrage, which is the largest irrigation project in Bangladesh. 188 The Dalia Barrage is 
part of the larger Teesta Barrage Irrigation Project, which also includes drainage channels, canal 
networks for irrigation, canal head regulator and flood embankment. This two-phase project has a 
“planned command area of 750,00 hectares and irrigable area of 540,000 hectares.”189 It must be 
stated that the Teesta is a lifeline in Bangladesh, particularly in meeting the agricultural and 
irrigation needs of the northern half of the country which is water scarce and drought prone. The 
Teesta river also helps flush silt and sediment out which is deposited in the lean months. 190 Thus, 
it is even more important to ensure sufficient flow from the river in dry months. However, it is 
precisely this withdrawal of irrigation water in the upstream region that decreases available water 
in the downstream basin in Bangladesh.191 Furthermore, because of the reduced water supply from 
the upstream region, the Bangladeshi barrage areas do not have enough water to meet the local 
demand for irrigation. A study has even found that the flow of the Teesta to Bangladesh has 
reduced up to 88% due to the construction of the Gozoldoba Barrage.192 Paradoxically, the release 
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of water during the monsoon season has been at crux of the “longstanding dispute between the two 
countries.”193 
 The Government of India’s Inter Linking of Rivers Project starting in 2005 also involves 
utilizing the Teesta’s waters.194 According to the plan, the water from the India’s Himalayan and 
rivers from the peninsular would be diverted through a “series of inter basin canals and dams, to 
water scarce and drought prone areas of Southern India.”195 The aim of this project was to irrigate 
30 million hectares as well as fulfil hydropower generation purposes with 20,000 to 25,000 
megawatts of power. Bangladeshi authorities were deeply concerned that the project would 
increase flooding in the country and decrease the availability of water in the lean months. This has 
remained a sore point in Indo-Bangladeshi relations particularly with Bangladesh arguing that the 
project has violated the 1996 Helsinki Rules on Water Resources and the following 2004 Berlin 
Rules on Water Resources which dictated fair sharing of waters of rivers between riparian states. 
The anxiety Bangladesh has over its political ecology with India was only exacerbated by the 
Supreme Court of India’s decision to set up a special committee to accelerate the implementation 
of the project in February 2012. 196 Additionally, the water diversion at Gazaldoba by India has 
been found to be linked to the increasing food insecurity in Bangladesh’s northwestern region 
which only bolsters the emerging narrative in Bangladesh that the Awami League has 











Figure 15. Map of the Galwan Valley clash.199 
 
Historical Background 
 The historical relations between India and China has definitely evolved over the years but 
can be marked by three phases. 200 The first phase was marked by bonhomie, for a period of ten 
years from the establishment of the People’s Republic of China until 1959. India viewed China as 
another Asian nation that had thrown off the shackles of imperialism and was ready for the dawn 
of a new postcolonial future. While it is true that the political systems of both countries did differ 
markedly, even members of India’s highest political echelons believed that China had much to 
offer in the way of learning and collaboration. It was only in 1959 that this spirit of camaraderie 
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came to an abrupt end with the border dispute regarding Tibet boiled over, with the Dalai Lama 
being forced to flee Lhasa, Tibet and take refuge in India. This marked a decisive turn in the Indo-
Chinese relations and for the next three years, was marked by simmering tensions which eventually 
culminated in the Sino-Indian War from October to November 1962. For Indians who had 
witnessed the humiliating defeat of 1962, China under the iron rule of the Communist Party began 
to be viewed as a belligerent neighbor which aimed to degrade a democratic India. It would take 
about 30 years to regain the friendly relations China and India once had. Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1989 as well as his meetings with Premier Deng Xiaoping was one 
such example of the turning tide. Curiously, the Indian prime minister did not see solving the 
border dispute as a precondition to improving relations in non-territorial areas.201 He believed that 
with more cooperation in the political and economic sphere, the resolution of the territorial dispute 
would evolve organically. This view was very much mistaken; economic and political ties 
improved without seeing any change in the border issue.  
 In the last quarter of the century, India has demonstrated a cautious admiration over China’s 
accomplishments in drastically reducing extreme poverty. At the same time, India questioned the 
implications of China’s meteoric rise for itself and of course, the durability of the international 
world order as we previously knew it. Both countries have ‘strongmen’ leaders at their respective 
helms; Xi Jinping who seems determined to pursue an expansionist territorial strategy as well as 
Narendra Modi who is equally ambitious and nationalistic. Tensions in 2020 rose, beginning in 
May, with India accusing China’s People’s Liberation Army of crossing the de facto border in the 
Ladakh region whilst China similarly inculpated India of challenging the status quo in the 
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contentious border region through constructing roads and defensive structures.202 In June, fighting 
broke out at the Galwan Valley where 20 Indian soldiers and an unspecified number of Chinese 
soldiers died.203 Thus, the latest relations between these co-riparians have been marred with tension 
and mutual distrust. 
State of Infrastructure 
India’s relationship with China in terms of transboundary water sharing is almost a mirror 
image of its relationship with lower riparian states such as Bangladesh. Thus, it is apparent that 
the state of infrastructure is highly contentious, with the Brahmaputra being characterized by a 
high dam density and significant environmental and socioeconomic impacts on the lower riparian, 
India. China is, through Tibet, the upper riparian which gives it the upper hand should it desire to 
‘weaponize’ water against countries downstream such as India. Thus, China’s large-scale 
infrastructure projects on the Brahmaputra become of great interest to ascertain this possibility. As 
of 2018, China’s development of the water resources of the Brahmaputra has been confined to a 
number of planned hydroelectric dam which has been, as argued by the Chinese government, to 
raise the standard of living in Tibet and support the Chinese government’s emphasis on clean 
energy.204 In the last twenty years, China has focused on improving their harnessing of water 
resources in Western China which has been spearheaded by China’s Ministry of Water Resources. 
Chinese economists such as Liu Peng proclaim that the Brahmaputra has the least amount of 
hydropower utilization rate of the whole of China’s large rivers but also has “greatest potential for 
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development.” Indeed, developing and harnessing hydropower within Tibet are part of a larger 
plan to stimulate economic growth in western China, known as xibu da kaifa (opening up the west). 
  
Figure 16. Map of China’s current and planned dams on the Yarlung/Brahmaputra.205 
 To meet the goal of raising the proportion of hydropower in non-fossil fuel energy 
consumption, the Chinese government has mandated accelerated construction of hydropower 
stations on major rivers such as the Brahmaputra. China has made progress in attaining this goal 
through its plans to construct four dams on the Brahmaputra in the Tibetan region. Only one of 
these dams, the Zangmu Dam in Gyaca County to the southeast of Lhasa, is operational. Zangmu 
Dam was opened in November 2014 and became fully operational in October 2015, with a total 
installed capacity of 510,000 kilowatt hours thereby increasing Tibet’s power generation 
capabilities by a quarter of what it was. This has been a huge source of tension with Delhi as 
Beijing had repeatedly denied any plans of building a dam at Zangmu for several years until it 
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began work on the infrastructure.206 More controversial however, are China’s possible intentions 
(though not officially announced) towards diverting the river to satisfy domestic demands for 
water, such as irrigation.  
 
Figure 17. Map of China’s current and planned routes of the South-North Water Diversion Project. 207 
 Why would China want to divert the Brahmaputra river? The answer lies in the serious 
water scarcity the nation faces; 20% of the world’s population lives in China and yet it only holds 
7% of the world’s freshwater resources. Considering the fact that even these limited resources are 
distributed unevenly with northern China making up 45% of the total populace, possessing 60% 
of its farmland but only 14% of the country’s supplies of freshwater.208 This situation has been 
made worse by variables such as poor pollution control, weak efforts in conversation and 
ineffective irrigation methods. This makes diversion very attractive. Dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo 
in particular seem to threaten India’s sense of security regarding its water supply such as the South-
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North Water Diversion Project. The large-scale water transfer project known as Nanshui Beidiao 
Gongcheng (South-North Water Diversion Project), which began in 2002. The eastern and central 
routes focus on the diversion of water from the Yangtze and Han Rivers, respectively to the 
northern Yellow River. These routes have been completed and supply water to cities such as 
Beijing and Tianjin. The western route, will focus on diverting the headwaters of three tributaries 
of the Yangtze, namely the Tongtian, Yalong and Dadhu rivers to the Yellow river by 2050. The 
tension with India arises from the fact that China now possesses a large scale mechanism of water 
diversion which could blockade the flow of the Brahmaputra to India.  
 Indian suspicions on China’s intentions of extra diversion of the Yarlung Tsangpo’s waters 
are not completely unjustified. For the past thirty years, there have been a myriad of Chinese 
scholars who had proposed diverting the Yarlung Tsangpo as a panacea beyond the official South-
North Water Diversion Project. The most well-known of these plans envisages diverting the river 
through a network of canals and dams through the Sichuan Province and into the Yellow river, 
which was propounded by a senior researcher at the Yellow River Water Conservancy 
Commission in 1990.209 The notion of this diversion of Tibetan rivers gained mainstream currency 
in Chinese public discourse through the publication of the book Xixang Zhi Shui Jiu Zhongguo 
(Tibet’s Waters Will Save China) by an officer named Li Ling in 2005. In the book, Li posits that 
the water from four rivers, including the Yarlung Tsangpo, could be diverted to the Yellow river. 
This idea has sparked international concern, especially in the eyes of Indian scholar Brahma 
Chellaney, that China is nursing hopes of river diversion in spite of official assurances to the 
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contrary.210 The parallels with the earlier official denials regarding the Zangmu dam, which then 
was built, is too close to be completely dismissed. 
Tensions continued to grow due to a recent announcement by the Chinese government in 
December 2020 regarding plans to build a dam which is probably going to be located near where 
the Yarlung Tsangpo flows downstream to India, an area known as ‘The Great Bend’. The 
transborder Yarlung river then flows into Indian territory via the northeastern state of Arunachal 
Pradesh, where it is known as Siang before reaching the another Indian state of Assam as the 
Brahmaputra river and then flowing into Bangladesh.211 The 60 million kWh hydropower 
harnessing project is expected to have three times the amount of hydropower generation of the 
Three Gorges Dam, which currently has the largest installed hydropower capability worldwide, 
according to Yan Zhiyong who is the chairman of the Power Construction Corporation of China 
(POWERCHINA), the company responsible for the building operations. This has magnified 
India’s fears about the adverse environmental impact China’s dam building could have on India. 
Indian officials see this development as exacerbating water scarcity through diverting water away 
from India to other parts of China which would make India water stressed during lean months or 
causing more flash floods by releasing the waters in the monsoon season. 212 This declaration on 
China’s part has spurred Indian officials to announce their considerations of building a dam to 
counteract effects of the Chinese dam upstream. According to Sayanangshu Modak, a junior fellow 
at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), the region already has a history of “avalanches and 
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landslides” as well as being “a hazard-prone region since it is tectonically active.”213 The 
possibility of the dam accidentally bursting does not bode well for India, but would leave China 
relatively untouched as the dam is located where the river exists China.  
Such concerns on the Indian side are perhaps, once again, justified due to the massive 
floods which wreaked havoc on Arunachal Pradesh in June 2000. The then Minister of State for 
External Affairs, Ajit Kumar Panja, responded to a parliamentary question on the matter by saying, 
“Following the recent flash flood in Arunachal Pradesh in June 2000, the matter was taken up with 
the Chinese Government. They conveyed that there was no dam on the Chinese side of the river 
Brahmaputra and attributed the occurrence of floods on the Indian side to natural causes.” 214 The 
Indian government does appear to have (at least publicly) concurred with the Chinese assessment 
of the affair. Information provided during interviews with the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) in 
Delhi in 2015 seems to support this view, as “some water blockage … at Great Bend [Shuomatan 
Point] in the Brahmaputra river basin possibly due to a natural landslide.”215 However, whether 
caused by intentional or unintentional Chinese activities, the fear of floods in India’s northeast 
remain a source of friction in negotiations between the two riparian states. 
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Figure 18. Map of the Yarlung/Brahmaputra.216 
Besides flooding, India harbors fears of sabotage of the Brahmaputra as evinced in the 
2017 incident where the Siang River joining the Lohit and the Dibang downstream was found to 
be muddy and blackened by the time it reached India. District authorities in Arunachal Pradesh 
sounded the alarm over the “large volumes of heavy slag” which made the water unfit for 
consumption and caused many fish to die. According to the East Siang district deputy 
commissioner Tamyo Tatak, they suspected China’s “deep water boring work” has caused the 
Siang to turn black for nearly two months.217  
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Figure 19. Siang River turning black. 
This incident severely impacted agriculture in the Siang Valley, which is one of the main 
rice producers of the state of Arunachal Pradesh. The local fishing communities were also 
adversely affected with the stock of fish decreasing. Although China claimed the river was heavily 
sedimented possibly because of an earthquake in November 2017, the river waters allegedly 
changed color before the earthquake occurred. 218  
Another example of an conflict inducing project would be the hydroelectric power 
generating Lalho Dam. China announced on 30th September 2016 that the Xiabuqu River has been 
blocked, which is a major tributary of the Yarlung Tsangpo flowing from Tibet. The Lalho project 
is expected to be completed by 2019 and designed to store up to 295 million cubic metres of water 
and is designed to help irrigate 30,000 hectares of farmland. The dam has the strategic importance 
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of being located just a few hours distance from the junction of Bhutan and Sikkim. For lower 
riparian states such as India, the concerns are twofold.219 
Firstly, the inherent disadvantage of the lower riparian in the issues of transboundary water 
sharing where it is relatively easy for upper riparians such as China to restrict the water flow into 
India without consulting the Indian authorities. This would be effectively a curtailment of the 
Indian water rights. In some ways, the Lalho project is symbolic of India’s perceptions of China’s 
treatment of the Yarlung Tsangpo in the future decades. As aforementioned, India too seeks to 
build dams in the Brahmaputra in response to China’s actions which could arguably start a new 
kind of ‘arms race’, a dams race. This would end disastrously if pursued without thought as the 
character of the river could be changed as well as the geographical stability of the region. If an 
earthquake should hit, millions would lose their lives and the dam would be rendered useless 
thereby putting India and China in a politically dangerous situation of competing for extremely 
scarce water resources. Secondly, the large role the river plays in the livelihood of the northeastern 
states must not be understated. Inhabitants of these already underdeveloped states center their lives 
around fishing, and transport through the tributaries of the Brahmaputra. 220 The fact that India and 
China have not brokered a comprehensive water treaty and share an efficient expert level 
information sharing mechanism only makes the contentious borders and rivers more volatile.  
 
Lack of Institutional Resilience 
 As previously mentioned, the relations between India and China are contentious in large 
part due to the absence of institutional resilience. This is demonstrated in the very modest progress 
 





in negotiations and information sharing. The earliest significant signs of progress was the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the provision of Hydrological Information of the River 
Brahmaputra/Yalzangbu in 2002 between India and China. The MoU would be valid for a period 
of five years upon the provision of hydrological information, including water level, discharge, and 
rainfall amount from three stations in Tibet on the Yarlung Tsangpo or the Brahmaputra River 
during the flood season (1 June – 15 October) by China to India. 221 222 This MoU has provided a 
medium to facilitate communication regarding the river. Besides MoUs, China and India signed a 
joint declaration in 2006 during the then president Hu Jintao’s visit to India in November 2006, to 
establish “an expert-level mechanism” to discuss emergency management in addition to other 
issues relating to transboundary rivers. This declaration promised ongoing sharing of hydrological 
data on the Yarlung Tsangpo without stipulating any mechanisms for implementation of said 
sharing. India has acknowledged that the data provided by China is useful for flood forecasting 
and therefore management.  
 However, it is worth noting the points made by domestic critics in India. They argue that 
the data sharing cooperation is at best limited and at worst, utterly unhelpful due to the information 
only stating the “volume of water figures and not from where or what time.”223 Others persuasively 
argued, in my opinion, that annualized data is not as critical as information on a regular basis. 
Others still posited that sharing data on water was useless unless accompanied by a concrete 
agreement. It can be argued that reliance on this hydrological data to manage floods in India can 
be dangerous, as it gives China great power through affording it the ability to withhold potentially 
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lifesaving information. After the Doklam skirmish (near the crossroads of Bhutan-China-India) in 
2017, there have been reports of China withholding hydrological data for the Brahmaputra and the 
Sutlej which resulted in floods in Assam and Uttar Pradesh. 224 
Indeed, the Indo-Chinese cooperation on sharing hydrological data has been limited. 
Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to India in May 2013 only yielded the meagre result of China agreeing 
to provide data twice a day. Even Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to China in October 
2013 did not lead to significant developments, despite coming back with the impressively titled 
‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Water Resources, the Republic of India 
and the Ministry of Water Resources, the People’s Republic of China on Strengthening 
Cooperation on Transborder Rivers’. The only meaningful change was that China agreed to start 
data sharing on the 15th of May as opposed to 1st June, which gave India two weeks more of data 
coverage.225 Therefore, it is important to examine what India had hoped for and did not achieve.  
 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had allegedly sought a joint mechanism with China to 
give better transparency on the project sites that Beijing had its eye on the Yarlung Tsangpo 
tributaries to ensure India would have specific information on the upstream projects in China, 
schedules of construction as well as the environmental and social impact on India downstream. In 
the absence of publicly available information exactly what India was asking for, it nonetheless 
appears that India did want to pursue stronger cooperation but was rebuffed by China. 226This 
pattern of unfruitful discussions continued even in 2014 when Indian Vice President Hamid Ansari 
signed the ‘Implementation Plan: Provision of Hydrological Information on the Yarlung 
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Zangbu/Brahmaputra River in Flood Season by China to India’. The document addresses types of 
data and mechanisms for exchanging information, which is laid out in extreme detail. The exact 
nature of the information to be shared is included to the decimal point, the mechanisms that the 
information is to be shared is also included whilst the accompanying details of hydrological 
information sharing are also shared. The agreement also mentions China’s concurrence on 
providing hydrological data if the water levels at the aforementioned stations are also close to or 
reaching warning water levels in non-flood season. This is significant as this is ostensibly the first 
time this phrase appeared in formal documentation between India and China. The implementation 
plan does encouragingly provide permission for both parties “after mutual consultation through 
diplomatic channels” to send “hydrological experts to each other’s country to conduct study tour[s] 
according to the principle of reciprocity.” On the surface, this suggests a clear establishment of 
cooperative framework on the issue of sharing the Brahmaputra/Yarlung Tsangpo.  
Upon closer examination, the situation is hardly as rosy as it seems. There has been no 
proof that the information has actually been shared or that experts have taken study tours in each 
country. The glaringly obvious fact remains; sharing hydrological data does not deal with China’s 
opacity on matters of dam building, water diversion or even water sharing. Prime Minister Modi’s 
2015 visit has not broken this stalemate on the Yarlung Tsangpo, possibly due to the more pressing 
and still unresolved border disputes between the country. Therefore the Brahmaputra basin in the 
context of Indo-China relations remains contentious due to China’s intentional window-dressing 
and sidestepping substantial agreements. China and India both favor bilateral agreements, which 
in this case, does not favor India. Certainly, bringing in more lower riparian states such as Nepal 
and definitely riverine Bangladesh will increase India’s bargaining power in negotiations. Even as 
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China “trumpets several bilateral water agreements”, none deal with actual sharing of the 
transboundary rivers or cooperation through institutions.227  
As seen in the 2014 agreement with India, some of these agreements are no more than 
glorified commercial contracts charging the other riparian for provision of vital hydrological data. 
Though others mention “joint research initiatives, flood-control projects, hydropower 
development, fishing, navigation, river islands, hydrologic work, border demarcation, 
environmental principles” and even friendly relations, China is actually in pursuit of nonbinding 
deals.228Instead, China seems to be playing the long game of distracting its neighbors while it 
unilaterally engineers favorable conditions on the Yarlung Tsangpo by building large dams and 
reservoirs in the borderlands which inevitably affect the lower riparian areas such as the northeast 
states of India, for whom the Siang is the regional lifeblood. China is not particularly keen on the 
notion of ‘water sharing’ per se as it sees standing and flowing waters as subject to the authority 
of the state where they are situated.229 This principle implies China has the right to divert however 
much water from rivers such as the Yarlung Tsangpo. By rejecting the 1997 United Nations 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses230, 
China revealed a frightening reluctance to submit to international dispute resolution. China’s 
delegation stated on record that the “text did not reflect the principle of territorial sovereignty over 
a watercourse state. Such a state had indisputable sovereignty over a watercourse which flowed 
through its territory.”231 Tensions seem to be prolonged with little reason to be optimistic.  
Lack of Social Stability 
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 Another source of tension leading to potential conflict between the riparian states is the 
fact that the river runs between two contentious bits of territory; Tibet and Arunachal Pradesh. The 
importance of Tibet to China is worth examining to understand why China will not pursue a ‘soft’ 
foreign policy on the Yarlung Tsangpo.232 Tibet is the source of most of Asia’s major river systems, 
such as the Brahmaputra / Yarlung Tsangpo, the Indus, the Sutlej, the Salween and the Mekong 
rivers. Though these rivers eventually pass through 11 different countries they all spring into being 
in Tibet. Thus, the Tibetan Plateau is the “spigot of Asia, and it is Beijing’s hand on the tap.”233 
Beyond the important goal of maintaining the strategic territorial integrity of China, control of 
Tibet keeps China independent in terms of water access. Therefore China is able to exercise 
hegemonic power over India, the only real possible competitor in the region. This suggests that 
China could keep constructing larger dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo and surrounding rivers if it 
means the ability to consolidate its power over its neighbors freshwater supplies, or at least threaten 
to do so. 
 More distressingly for India, China does view Arunachal Pradesh as “southern Tibet”. 234 
Hence, India is eager to consolidate “India’s rights to the territory where the transboundary 
Brahmaputra flows rather than to the waters of the river per se.” India is worried about the disputed 
territory through which the Yarlung Tsangpo flows due in some part to China’s international 
attempts to challenge the status quo. China moved to prevent India from receiving almost a loan 
from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) worth almost $3 billion as it involved funding for a $60 
million for a flood control and hydrological program in Arunachal Pradesh.235 No doubt China too 
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sees India as attempting to challenge China’s claims over the disputed territory. A scenario where 
China would use the pretext of water to secure further territorial concessions is surely foreseeable 
by Indian authorities, leading to a thickening of mistrust in the borderlands of the Brahmaputra 
Basin.  
Overall Tenor of relationship 
 The nature of the relationship between China and India has very rarely been one of 
camaraderie, especially within the last five years. As strange as it sounds, China is on its way to 
becoming a hydrohegemon in South Asia but is unsatisfied enough with its territory in the 
borderlands to disrupt the status quo. The Galwan Valley dispute is perhaps the most salient 
example of concept. China and India do have territorial disputes that date back to the 1950s and 
which culminated in the 1962 Sino-Indian war. However, the clash on the 15th of June 2020 has 
been the first clash resulting in fatalities since the October 1975 and is the most serious border 
skirmish since 1967.236 While the origins of the dispute are unclear, it is certain that twenty Indian 
soldiers died with an unconfirmed number of Chinese soldiers dead.  
 The incident reveals that existing boundary agreements made between 1993 and 2013 are 
insufficient in deterring conflict. Secondly, it suggests that India and China do not agree on which 
regions are contested and which disputes have been settled. Although Beijing is claiming rights 
over the Galwan Valley, the area has not been a traditional flashpoint since 1962. The nature of 
the stand-off has changed significantly from previous clashes. In the past, both countries had 
skirmishes in 2013 and 2014 in Ladakh and also engaged in a 73 day standoff in Doklam where 
India accused China of “trying to unilaterally change the territorial status quo.”237 The stand-off 
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last year however involved Chinese attempts to challenge India’s hold at multiple points in the 
western sector of the Indo-Chinese border as well one point as the eastern sector of the border. The 
scale of the dispute has also intensified greatly than previous incidents, with a much larger number 
of troops and military equipment. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, the level of 
aggressiveness in the latest conflict is much higher than past skirmishes which demonstrates a 
willingness on China’s part at least to use armed conflict to contest the status quo.  
  
 
Figure 20. Map of Galwan Valley conflict.238 
 None of this bodes particularly well for Indo-Chinese relations on transboundary water 
issues. In fact, the deterioration of overall relations could mean even the meagre progress made by 
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New Delhi in reaching some form of cooperation with Beijing could be overturned. China could 
even arguably use the water related disagreements to formulate a pretext to encroach into India’s 
vulnerable northeast, especially Arunachal Pradesh. Beijing continues to claim that this region 
abutting Tibet was once part of the kingdom of Tibet and now, must belong to China whereas India 
sees the state as a legitimate part of India due to a 1914 treaty signed between Tibet and Great 
Britain. 239The historical context is tense as the two sides fought the 1962 war over Arunachal 
Pradesh which ended with China agreeing to preserve the status quo. However, the area remains a 
point of contention between New Delhi and Beijing as they have not reached a consensus on the 
question of ownership over Arunachal Pradesh.240 The possibility of armed conflict over an issue 



















239 Michael T. Klare, ‘Climate Change, Water Scarcity, and the Potential for Interstate Conflict in South Asia’, 




Section 3: Impact of Water Scarcity on Relations with 
India241 
 
Before the discussions on water scarcity, it must be iterated that water scarcity is an 
interaction between the supply of water and the demand for it. Hence, I will be briefly discussing 
the impact climate change will have on the water supply in the two basins, then succinctly 
exploring how water stressed each country will be internally before diving into how water scarcity 
affects the relationship between India and its neighbors.  
 




  Water supply in the Ganges basin is determined by precipitation from the southwest 
monsoon as well as meltwater from snow in the Himalayan Mountains.242 Changes in the climate 
will is anticipated to result in changes in regional air surface temperature as well as precipitation 
levels. This in turn affects the intensity and patterns of the monsoon season, mountain ice, 
snowmelt as well as other climate and water systems. In the upper riparian states in the Ganges 
River basin, surface temperatures are predicted to increase with larger amounts of warming in the 
winter months than summer. Studies have shown significant increasing trends in annual 
temperature of 1.4 °C over the past 100 years in the northwestern Himalayas, which is higher than 
the global increase in average temperature by 0.74°C. 243This increase in warming at higher 
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altitudes is expected to cause earlier thawing of the snow and ice in the Himalayas, as well as a 
unrelenting retreat of the glaciers, the worrying sublimation of the snow pack and glacial water as 
well as the smaller snow pack and the formation of glacial lakes. Runoff from the anticipated 
glacial retreat is projected to increase and occur earlier than typically expected, which increases 
annual discharge into the Ganges River in the short term while decrease runoff in the long term as 
snow packs and glaciers become smaller. Furthermore, high seasonal concentration and variability 
of the rainfall is expected to increase both the intensity and frequency of extreme events such as 
flooding when high amounts of precipitation occur and conversely prolonged droughts in times of 
low precipitation. Predictions under the assumption of a global rise in temperature of 1.5°C means 
that flood peaks could increase by 20% for the Ganges River. This is particularly worrying as 




 Climate change is predicted to have notable impacts on the hydrology and water resources 
available in this basin. Water availability in the Brahmaputra Basin is anticipated to reduce on 
average, due to the predicted decrease in streamflow and increase in evapotranspiration.244 The 
flow of the Teesta too is expecting to react adversely to climate change. This is especially true as 
the Teesta is a rain and snow fed river, with several glaciers and glacial lakes in the upper reaches 
of the basin in Sikkim forming the source of headwaters of the river. The upper catchment areas 
of the Teesta Basin is especially vulnerable to “sudden variations in rainfall and temperature due 
to the high altitude and mountainous topography.”245 Recently, Sikkim has witnessed a number of 
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sudden and destructive glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs) with several possibly dangerous 
glacial lakes identified in the upper catchment area in this region. The general predicted trend of 
hydrological impact of climate change on the Brahmaputra River basin can be applied to the Teesta 
river to understand how the future of the river will look like. It is highly likely that there will be 
an accelerated melting of the glaciers that feed the rivers, which at first will result in more periodic 
and intense flooding. However, as the glaciers continue to retreat from the warming, there will 
unfortunately be a drastic decrease in the flow of the Teesta’s waters.246 
 
Projections of how water stressed countries will be 
China 
 
 China has one of the largest populations globally, with an estimated 1.398 million people 
according to the World Bank as of 2019. 247 The impending water scarcity China faces is due to 
complicated interactions between pollution, energy, urbanization and climate change. Nearly 15% 
of water in China’s primary rivers cannot be used because of how polluted they are and 7.4% of 
irrigated land is done so using polluted water. Due to rapid population growth and equally rapid 
urbanization, China does have a huge demand for energy, water and food. Water scarcity inhibits 
its ability to fulfil all three needs. Should the current rapacious rates of growth continue, China’s 
demand for water will outstrip supply. As China develops more, and as its population is projected 
to reach 1.5 billion people by 2030, it is highly likely that the Chinese population will consume 
more meat, vegetables and fruit all of which are water intensive products. The country will also 
look towards building more dams to harness the dwindling flows of its major rivers to provide 
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energy for its growing urban populace. Thus, China is on track to become one of the world’s most 
water stressed nations in the future. 248 
India 
 
 With the Ganges River’s flow expected to decrease, India will be especially stressed in the 
agriculture sector. In the western part of the basin such as the states of Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, 
agriculture is heavily reliant on large scale “surface water and groundwater irrigation facilities to 
produce rice, wheat, cotton and sugar cane among other crops.”249 In the eastern portion of the 
basin such as the states of eastern Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal, farmers produce rice, 
wheat, vegetables and ricefish. With agricultural productivity being affected, food security will 
decrease in India. Both types of farming will be adversely affected by the onset of water shortages. 
The energy sector will be affected as well; demand for electricity in the Ganges basin is growing 
and limited power generation capacity has meant expensive energy shortages.250 Hydropower that 
could be harnessed from the Ganges and perhaps more feasibly for India, from the Brahmaputra, 
will be stalled. India faces becoming even more water stressed due to the rapid population growth, 
significant industrialization and rural-urban migration. With urban centers degrading the quality 
of India’s aquifers, India will have face a serious water crisis particularly with its poor water 
storage capabilities.251  
Bangladesh 
 
 Bangladesh being an agrarian country does depend heavily on water for human 
consumption, irrigation, transportation and economic development. As Bangladesh too begins 
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rapid industrialization and undergoes economic growth, so too does its need for hydropower and 
water for industrial purposes increase. As previously mentioned, the Ganges-Brahmaputra Basin 
is vulnerable to climate change, and this will likely mean a reduction in river flows during the lean 
months. This problem is made worse by inefficient management and pollution of water at the 
national level. This water stress faced by Bangladesh is further exacerbated by the fact that though 
80% of the country’s territory lies within the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna flood plain, only 
around 7% to 8 % of the total basin area is covered by the country.252 This means that Bangladesh 
relies on upper riparian states to distribute adequate amounts of water, with 92.5% of surface water 
in the nation provided by sources outside Bangladesh. Thus, floods and droughts both threaten the 
sensitive development-food-energy nexus present in the country, which creates water stress as 
more dramatic climate events occur due to climate change. 
 
Impact of Water Scarcity on relationships 
India- Bangladesh 
 
 It is highly unlikely that armed conflict will take place at a national scale between India 
and Bangladesh due to the asymmetry in power in India’s favor. Instead, I predict an outcome of 
reluctant cooperation. Having analyzed the factors that make the relationship regarding 
transboundary waters between India and Bangladesh contentious, it is apparent that freshwater 
scarcity will exacerbate salinization of river waters necessary for agricultural production, fisheries 
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Large numbers of displaced population due to actions of another riparian state 
 As earlier discussed at length, freshwater flow in the Ganges Basin of Bangladesh is 
heavily influenced by the Farakka Barrage. The lack of a precise water sharing treaty has meant 
inefficient and even inequitable management of water resources. Thus, the barrage dramatically 
decreases freshwater flow in the Ganges River, particularly during the dry season. By reducing the 
upstream flows, the barrage has resulted in salinization of the ecosystem and reduces the fertility 
of the soil.253 A reduction in upstream flow is also correlated with high sedimentation and river 
erosion. In addition, freshwater is already sporadically available and is not abundant enough to 
meet the rapidly growing demands for water particularly during the lean months.  When combined 
with decreasing water availability and more erratic variability, Bangladesh will become even more 
water stressed than it presently is.  
This will most likely increase the amount of climate refugees fleeing economic and 
environmental devastation as flooding increases and the dry season is extended. A good portion of 
these displaced populations will head to the northeast of India to states like Assam and also to 
West Bengal at least temporarily. Given the earlier analysis of historic tensions between the 
indigenous Assamese who are Hindu and the mostly Muslim Bengali speaking migrants, there is 
bound to be outbreaks of communal violence. This will ostensibly cause friction between India 
and Bangladesh, particularly if Bangladesh denies that its citizens are ‘illegally migrating’ to India. 
If a Hindutva government is still in power, this influx of Muslim migrants is likely to be a thorn in 
its side.  
Lack of institutional resilience changing for better 
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 Bangladesh is likely to escalate calls for concrete and equitable agreements on water 
sharing of the Teesta and Ganges rivers. If not given additional incentives to cooperate, India as 
an upper riparian facing water stress will not willingly divert more water to Bangladesh via either 
the Teesta or the Ganges rivers if it feels it needs the resources urgently. However, if Bangladesh 
makes it clear that it will go to China for aid and water supplies which will inevitably affect India, 
it is possible that India can be persuaded to take Bangladesh’s concerns more seriously.254 If China 
assumes the role of aggressive regional hydrohegemon within South Asia, it could unintentionally 
unite Bangladesh, India and other lower riparian states such as Nepal and Pakistan with a common 
goal and common enemy. Furthermore, water scarcity could mean a sense of urgency regarding 
the signing of the 2011 Teesta Agreement. The political consensus between Bangladesh, India and 
the state of West Bengal could become better aligned as we see a greater realization of the 
presience of the matter.  
Indo-Bangladeshi rapprochement  
 With water scarcity adversely affecting both parties and Indian fearing China’s belligerent 
approach to the Brahmaputra, Bangladesh’s desire for internationalizing the issue of equitable 
water allocations could also be adopted by Indian authorities. I foresee a larger role of 
institutionalized multilateral water sharing frameworks to manage the water crisis. To dissuade 
Bangladesh from pursuing closer ties with China and to discourage other South Asian countries 
from doing the same, India could become proactive in sending bilateral or even multilateral aid 
under the framework of water sharing agreements. There is a potentially large role for the formerly 
inefficient Joint Rivers Commission to play in advocating for better cooperation to take advantage 
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of this new regional formation. More cordial relations between Modi’s administration and 
Bangladesh herald good things to come for Indo-Bangladeshi rapprochement especially when in 
July 2014, the two countries resolved their “long-standing maritime boundary dispute” through the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration.255 India has even tried to cultivate better relations by selling 
Bangladesh electricity from its power plants and approving $2 billion dollars of development 
financing in 2016.256 Bangladesh seems happy to reciprocate by cooperating with India on matters 
important to the Indian government such as counterterrorism. Thus I will reiterate here that 





Contentious State of Infrastructure 
The Indo-Chinese case is definitely more complex than the India-Bangladesh one. For one, 
it has been marked recently by aggressive foreign policy on China’s part and a definite willingness 
to use conflict to tackle issues of border disputes. Secondly, both countries are large and have a 
rising middle class which puts tremendous pressure on the need for water resources to provide 
hydropower generation, which makes control of the flow of transboundary resources key to both 
development and national security. As evidenced by the Galwan Valley incident recently and 
potential allegations that China has withheld information that could have prevented such large 
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The chances of an immediate armed conflict are relatively low, as India will seek to use 
the typical toolbox of non-escalation gestures in the realm of international relations first. India will 
probably seek to engage in bilateral if not multilateral diplomatic talks, appeals to international 
law, perhaps even attempt to place sanctions on China. There is a much greater chance of unstable 
stasis, where both countries exist neither in a state of cooperation nor conflict. The barriers for 
cooperation are high. One glaringly important barrier is the issue of unresolved ownership over 
the state of Arunachal Pradesh or ‘South Tibet’ as it is known will act as the limiting factor in the 
negotiations over transboundary water rights and obligations in a water treaty.  
Lack of institutional resilience 
 It also appears that New Delhi will try to uphold its user rights when it comes to the 
Brahmaputra River, as well as consolidating its existing territorial claims. However, the best way 
to establish user rights with a country as fanatical about dam building as China is to engage in dam 
building as well. However, given the internal strength of democracy in India, it is impossible to 
keep up pace with a large, centralized economy.257 Therefore China will have the upper hand in 
dictating the overall course of negotiations over the Yarlung Tsangpo/ Brahmaputra, which 
currently favors much hot air and very little talk about substantive issues. Under such a framework 
and in the context of reducing meltwater leading to decreased river flows, India is left at the mercy 
of an upper riparian who will not seek concessions through institutional frameworks but rather 
through territorial challenges to the status quo, as witnessed in the 2020 Galwan Valley clash. 
Overall hostile relations 
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Moreover, the mutual distrust will be difficult to overcome in a short period of time. India 
certainly fears the environmental effects of what appears to be an incessant appetite for dams, as 
was witnessed in the 2002 floods and the Siang River turning black. The reluctance of China to 
abide by international water norms and conventions does not do anything to assuage India’s 
anxieties regarding the large-scale water diversion projects China has recently embarked on. With 
a deepening US-India relationship in the making and no upper riparian to fear consequences from, 
China could use its structural advantage as upper riparian to punish India for not toeing the Beijing 
line.258 Without a shared framework to contain China’s aggression, the unstable stasis could end 





 It is often said that he who controls the water controls the world. Nowhere else in the world 
is this truer than in South Asia, especially when viewed through the lens of a burgeoning power 
such as China. The relationships India shares with its neighbors over the transboundary rivers of 
the Brahmaputra and the Ganges are invariably very different. India has much more power in terms 
of structural position as upper riparian and sheer size over Bangladesh than it does over China. 
China on the other hand seems to replicate the power dynamic India holds over Bangladesh and 
magnifies it. Bangladesh and India arguably are on track to more cordial and fruitful relations 
regarding water sharing of the Ganges and Teesta Rivers. Thus, in a scenario with water scarcity, 
India could be persuaded to be more flexible with Bangladesh’s concerns as it guards against 
encroachment in its borderlands with China and ensures the unstable stasis with Beijing does not 
erupt into war.  
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